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question regarding U.S. efforts to discourage development of the 

 centrifuge process at home and abroad because of possible effects 

 upon the U.S. position in the world enrichment market, and, perhaps 

 more importantly, because of the implications of centrifuge tech- 

 nology for nonproliferation. On the other hand, if the commercial 

 use of the centrifuge enrichment process appears to be inevitable, 

 what could U.S. diplomacy do to influence the use and control of that 

 technology ? 



The centrifugal process is not a new technological surprise. It was 

 one option open to the Manhattan Project during World War IT and 

 some research and development has been carried on since then. What 

 is new now is the concerted effort of several European states to develop 

 the process as an alternative to that now used by the United States, 

 the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and France. 



The new work is being carried on by Dutch and German groups. 

 Not committed by past technological decisions and investments, these 

 groups in the early 1950's revived work on the centrifuge to enrich 

 uranium. The United States also kept some centrifuge work alive at 

 Oak Ridge, but did not deploy it. By the late 1950's, enough progress 

 had been made in West Germany for the British to reopen their centri- 

 fuge studies and later in the 1960's, the first steps were taken toward 

 multinational development of a working uranium enrichment capa- 

 bility using this process outside the framework of the International 

 Atomic Energy Agency, the European Nuclear Energy Asrencv, or 

 Euratom. 



THE CENTRIFUGE AND PROLIFERATION 



In addition to significant technological differences between the gas 

 centrifuge and the gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of ura- 

 nium, there are other economic and security differences of international 

 concern. Whereas the gaseous diffusion process of the United States 

 requires major capital investment in large facilities and great amounts 

 of electricity, both of which are difficult to conceal, the gas centrifuge 

 process in principle can be employed on a much smaller scale, at less 

 capital investment, with considerably less demand for electricity for 

 each kilogram of enriched uranium produced ; all these make it easier 

 to conceal. Gas centrifuge factories offer flexibility in construction 

 and operation; additional units can be readily added, which means 

 that plant investment can be closely geared to actual growth of the 

 nuclear fuel market, and the capital investment can be spread out in 

 time. Of course, the smaller the installation the less the rate of produc- 

 tion for enriched uranium. On the other hand, the centrifuge process 

 should in principle be able to produce weapons grade materials as 

 well as nuclear fuel material. Existing enriched nuclear fuel from 

 other sources might be illegallv diverted to gas centrifuge factories, 

 thus making the production of weapons quality material easier and 

 more feasible in smaller facilities. 



For these reasons, the construction of gas centrifuge plants would 

 >aiso questions about the effectiveness of safeguards. It would be pos- 

 sible in practice for smaller nations to join the "nuclear club" by 

 building concealed centrifuge enrichment plants which might use 

 for their feed materials enriched uranium ostensibly obtained to fuel 

 nuclear power reactors. 



