268 



a da, Japan, perhaps Argentina, the Scandinavian nations, and West- 

 Germany. These nations naturally expect something in return for 

 foregoing development of their own nuclear weapons capability. In 

 addition to sharing in benefits from nuclear power, they expect to be 

 protected from proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among 



their neighbors.. 



The Nonproliferation Treaty obliges nations having nuclear weap- 

 ons to share the benefits of nuclear energy with the other nations, 

 and also to support the International Atomic Energy Agency as it 

 struggles to perfect credible and acceptable safeguards systems. Each 

 state party to the Treaty needs to be assured that fissionable material 

 in the possession of each non-nuclear- weapon neighbor is not used to 

 make weapons. IAEA has the unenviable task of an international 

 watchdog to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapons states fulfill their 

 obligations under the Treaty. Each such state has committed itself to 

 negotiate an agreement with the IAEA under which it will accept 

 safeguards to verify compliance with these obligations. But the 

 Treaty does not itself specify the nature of the safeguards system to 

 be adopted. 



U.S. Ratification and Support of the Treaty 



As a nuclear-weapons state, the United States is exempt from 

 IAEA safeguards. Nonetheless, when President Johnson signed 

 the Nonprohferation Treaty on July f, 1968, he offered to put com- 

 merieal nuclear power in the United States under IAEA safeguards. 

 He said : 329 



We will cooperate fully to bring the Treaty safeguards into being. We shall 

 thus help provide the basis of confidence that is necessary for increased coopera- 

 tion in the peaceful nuclear field. After the Treaty has come into force, we will 

 permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to :ill 

 nuclear activities in the United States — excluding only those with direct na- 

 tional security significance. Thus the United States is not asking any country 

 to accept any safeguards that we are not willing to accept ourselves. 



In this commitment, President Johnson repeated his earlier offer of 

 December 2, 1967. The United Kingdom made a similar offer on De- 

 cember 4. 1967. The Soviet Union did not join in these offers. Instead, 

 it took the position that inspection of any atomic activities within 

 the nuclear-weapons countries was unnecessary and irrelevant as the 

 Treaty does not prohibit these nations from having or manufacturing 

 nuclear weapons. 



The Ratification Treaty was opened for signature on July 1. 1968, 

 and was signed that same day by the United States, the United King- 

 dom, the Soviet Union, and 53 other members of the United Nations. 

 President. Johnson transmitted the Treaty to the Senate on .Inly 9. 

 lie advised the Congress thai the Treaty would do more than just pro- 

 hibit the spread of nuclear weapons. It would also promote the fur- 

 ther development of nu, deai- energy for peaceful purposes. Elaborat- 

 ing the anticipated benefits of the Treaty, the President said : 



I believe Hint tins treaty will greatly advance the goal of unclear cooperation 

 for peaceful purposes under international safeguards. 



It will require that all parties which export nuclear materials and equip- 

 ment n. non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful purposes make sure that such 

 materials, and those used or produced in such equipment, are under international 

 safeguards. 



3=8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 4 (July 8 1968) p 1044 

 ^"Nuctc'ir Nonproliferation Treaty," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 

 vol. 4 (July 15. 1968), p. 1091. 



