270 



The safeguards impasse was not resolved until May 1968 when the 

 United States and the Soviet Union jointly presented a final draft 

 of the Treaty to the United Nations, which avoided the issue by 

 committing; non-nuclear weapons states to negotiate safeguards agree- 

 ments with the IAEA either individually or together with other 

 states. The Secretary of State, in submitting the Treaty to the Presi- 

 dent and recommending its transmittal to the Senate, pointed to the 

 statement of principles enumerated by the U.S. Co-chairman of the 

 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (now the Conference of the 

 Committee on Disarmament, or CCD) and by Ambassador Arthur 

 Goldberg when the Treaty was presented to the United Nations 

 General Assembly. The principles were : 333 



(1) The safeguards system of the IAEA must be credible; 



(2) Individual nations or groups of nations could negotiate 

 safeguards agreements with the IAEA. By indirection this meant 

 Euratom could do so ; 



(3) Existing national records and safeguards should be used 

 by the IAEA. 



Safeguards Provisions of the Treaty 



Probably the most controversial part of the negotiations concerned 

 the issue of verification of nuclear materials holdings. Article III sets 

 out terms and conditions for safeguards, prohibited acts, non-inter- 

 ference with safeguards, and for agreements between the IAEA and 

 signatory states. The arrangements finally agreed to were as follows : 



Scope: Safeguards shall be applied on all source or special fission- 

 able material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory, 

 jurisdiction, or control of non-nuclear-weapon parties, for the exclu- 

 sive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations 

 under the Treaty not to divert fissionable materials to weapons use. 



Prohibited acts: Transfer is prohibited of source or special fission- 

 able material or equipment or material especially designed or pre- 

 pared for the processing, use, or production of special nuclear material, 

 to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the item 

 shall be subject to safeguards. 



Non-interference : Safeguards shall be implemented ?o as to avoid 

 hampering either the economic and technological development of the 

 parties or international cooneration in peaceful nuclear activities. 



Safeguards agreements : The Treaty commits the non-weapons signa- 

 tories to negotiate details of a safeguards agreement with the Inter- 

 national Agency, and specifies how these agreements are to be nego- 

 tiated. Non-weapons parties may enter into such agreements with 



838 The detailed statement of those principles follows : 



(1) There should he safeguards for all non-nueloar weapons parties of such a nature 

 that all parties ean have confidence in their effectiveness. Therefore safeguards estab- 

 lished bv an agreement negotiated and Concluded with the IAEA in accordance with 

 the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system must enable the IAEA 

 to ctrrv out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion Is taking place. 



(2) In discharging their obligations under Article III. non-nuclear-weapons parties 

 may negotiate safeguards agreements with the 1 VKA individually or together with 

 other parties : 'ind sneciflcallv. ail agreement covering such obligations may be entered 

 Into between tbe IAEA and other international organization the work of which is 

 related to the IAEA and the membership of which Includes the parties concerned. 



(3) In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make nnnronriate 

 use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed 

 arrangements the IAEA can satisfy Itself that nuclear material is not diverted to 

 nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 



Of. U.S. Congress. Senate. Commltl >n Foreign Relations. Hearings, Nonproliferation 



Treaty, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968 part 1 p. 255. 



