274 



Reactors would be subject to a predetermined inspection rate, while 

 that for other facilities would depend upon the throughput of nuclear 

 materials or their inventory. The inspection effort contemplated under 

 the new approach ranges'from one inspection per year for modest 

 facilities, such as research reactors, to several man-years of continuous 

 inspection in the case of commercial scale reprocessing or fuel fabrica- 

 tion plants. The arrangements also permit the Agency to employ a 

 part of its routine inspection effort on an unannounced basis. In the 

 case of sensitive facilities such as fuel reprocessing plants, the maxi- 

 mum inspection effort would rise in proportion to the square root of 

 the throughput, reflecting the concept that large size plants give eco- 

 nomies of scale not only of operating costs but also for the inspection 

 effort needed. 341 



"strategic points" 



The Safeguards Committee proposed one answer to the question 

 of how far IAEA inspectors could go in performing their functions. 

 It advanced the concept of "strategic points,'' which are also explicitly 

 recognized in the Treaty. The "strategic points" concept means that 

 Agency inspectors would normally confine their access to locations 

 selected by the Agency in advance, where nuclear material can be 

 most easily measured, contained, or observed. IAEA inspectors would 

 stay at these points and not roam throughout the facilities. In this 

 way. the chance that an inspector might obtain technological informa- 

 tion of commercial value can be reduced and interference with plant 

 operations held to a minimum. 



The effectiveness of this limited inspection concept depends on new 

 technological advances and administrative skills. Development of 

 tamper-proof instruments and seals, for example, will be needed. Some 

 procedures that have been developed will impress some countries or 

 observers as too harsh ; others as too lenient. Disagreements can be 

 expected between the IAEA and the countries subject to inspections. 

 Nevertheless the fact that many nations have agreed to subject a po- 

 tentially significant, future undertaking — the commercial use of 

 nuclear power — to international inspection is encouraging. 



enforcement or safeguards 



The Safeguards Committee of the IAEA inevitably has had to deal 

 with the question : what would be done in the event of a known or 

 suspected diversion? This question, it will be recalled, was one of the 

 most thorny and unresolved issues in the abortive negotiations of the 

 Banich plan. 



The draft agreement provides for procedures designed to afford op- 

 portunity for resolution of any diversion issue through consultation 

 between the TAEA and the nation concerned. Should this not be pos- 

 sible, the TAEA Board of Governors is empowered to apply the pro- 

 vision of the Agency statute relating to noncompliance which includes 

 among other steps, a report to the United Nations Security Council. 

 The agreement also provides for the arbitration of disputes by an 

 impartial tribunal, except those relating to a finding of non- 

 verification. 



M1 Frnnk Bnrnnhy. Director of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, quips that 

 this must he the first time a square root appears In an International agreement. 



