277 



III is just as blank as if it remained without words. The words it contains mean 

 nothing. The treaty remains without any provisions for enforcement whatever. 

 B. In any event, to speak of IAEA safeguards as something which exist and 

 can be relied upon to enforce this treaty is ridiculous to the point of absurdity. 

 Anyone familiar with the primitive capabilities either technological or financial, 

 of IAEA in the safeguards area knows this. I personally verified it myself only 

 last September at IAEA headquarters. To assert or imply that IAEA safeguards 

 are something which can be relied upon for the heavy purpose of policing this 

 treaty is misleading and unconscionable. It will take years for IAEA to achieve 

 even a minimum inspection capability. . . . IAEA inspection is simply a facade 

 like a Hollywood movie setting, there is a front with no structure behind it. 

 As a matter of fact, IAEA has fewer inspectors than this committee has mem- 

 bers . . . for all of Europe they have five inspectors. . . . 



Costs of Safeguards 



Questions were raised during negotiations of the Treaty whether the 

 IAEA could recruit the staff to administer its safeguards responsi- 

 bilities. There were also fears that the costs would be enormous. Chair- 

 man Seaborg countered these two points >m 1968. He regarded the 

 IAEA safeguards staff while then modest in size as nevertheless in bal- 

 ance with the worlrtio be done. He also expressed confidence that the 

 Agency would be able to recruit the necessary people for its expanded 

 function. As for expenses, obviously the costs for administering safe- 

 guards would go up. However, these Costs, when pro-rated against the 

 cost of nuclear power, would represent no more than a fraction of one 

 percent of the cost of electricity produced. A projection of manpower 

 and funding, prepared by the AEC's Brookhaven National Labora- 

 tory, estimated requirements of IAEA safeguards as increasing from 

 775 persons and $29.8 million in 1971 to 2,374 persons and $143 million 

 by the year 1990. Comparing these costs with the estimated value of 

 nuclear generated electricity produced an estimated cost increase of 

 0.16 mills per kilowatt-hour for 1971, which would drop to 0.02 mills 

 per kilowatt-hour by 1990. 347 



• More recently, in 1970 ? Brookhaven revised its estimates for man- 

 power and financial requirements for IAEA safeguards. 438 Table VI 

 lists the latest BNL estimates of manpower requirements and the 

 future costs of implementing IAEA safeguards. It assumes that power 

 reactors and nuclear fuel facilities in 17 non- weapons countries — which 

 would include all of the European nations except France and the 

 United Kingdom — will be safeguarded under the Treaty. 



A summary of the number of nuclear facilities in non- weapons states 

 to be safeguarded by IAEA is given in Table VII. Little change in 

 the number of conversion, fabrication, and reprocessing facilities is . 

 expected, but by. 1980 the number of power reactors should increase, 

 and likewise the number of Countries safeguarded. 



ljhe present safeguards staff of the IAEA numbers about 60. Brook- 

 Raven estimates this must, increase to 275 if the Treaty is to be fully 

 implemented by 1^73. This growth of almost 500 percent in less than 

 3 ydars would probably fee difficult for IAEA to attain. If so, the 

 Agency initially may ha^e to accept a lower level of safeguards. 

 " : . ^i number of conditions ap'pears necessary to achieve effective safe- 

 gfudrcls at acceptable eodts; These iriclude : (1) standarization of the 

 existing systems of control and management, (2) adoption of a uni- 



'««-ibtti.,p. 154, • ••:>.. >-th '•:■.'■!■■.'•• ' ,• ;■' ' ..'■..'' ':':.' 



848 L. Green, H. Kouts, and W. Marcuse, IAEA Costs and Manpower RequlreYnetita tinder. 

 VPT (Upton, •'N'.'Y.;: Technical Support Organization, Broofchaven National , laboratory, 

 September 1970, report No. BNL 50263), 34 pp. . - -,■ .'•■•',' V 



