280 



tion ? Can a system not concerned with prevention of theft or catching 

 and punishing thieves, accurately be called "safeguards" ? 



There may be a tendency for international safeguards to become the 

 glamour segment of the overall anti-proliferation effort. Representa- 

 tive Hosmer addressed this issue : 356 



Safeguards people, their systems and analyses, methodologies, black boxes, game 

 theories, non-destructive test paraphernalia preventing diversion. This may be a 

 very dangerous assumption in the real world, populated by very fallible people, 

 some of whom are very certain to be just no damn good. 



In any event, the world political community probably ought to be doing a lot 

 more than it is now. . . . 



Deterrence can be made more certain by boosting the illicit diverter's risk of 

 getting caught, thereby both incurring punishment and losing the profits of his 

 crime. 



If, under our safeguards system of international public opinion, when a diver- 

 sion is discovered, the alarm sounds, whistles blow, sirens scream, the United 

 Nations is notified, and it all strikes fear and terror in the hearts of the general 

 public, that is one thing. Quite another and far better thing is if it scares the hell 

 out of the criminal because he knows that the jig is up. 



Every increase in the likelihood of a quick and positive identification and appre- 

 hension of a nuclear criminal plays a key role in fortifying the deterrent equation. 

 So also does every increase in the degree of certainty with which the stolen item 

 can be recovered. 



Physical security of nuclear fuel materials appears not to be a con- 

 cern of the IAEA. Mr. Hosmer raised the issue whether the Agency 

 should be involved with physical security by establishing guidelines 

 for police training, indoctrination, and equipment for this highly 

 specialized responsibility. He would have the major nuclear nations 

 actively assist other countries in developing a worldwide network of 

 nuclear police systems. 



Providing an ultimate answer to this question is another task for 

 U. S. diplomacy in this nuclear age. 



Nonprollferation and Euratom 



Had the Soviet Union succeeded in having IAEA safeguards apply 

 to all peaceful nuclear activities, IAEA would have had to take over 

 the safeguards already established by Euratom. The United States, 

 however, favored a continued safeguards function for Euratom. The 

 diplomatic situation on this issue was outlined for the House Com- 

 mittee on Foreign Affairs early in 1968 by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy 

 Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was 

 deeply involved in negotiation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. 357 



As late ns August 19G7 the provisions for non-proliferation remained 

 blank. As Mr. Fisher explained the situation : "* 



We bad no safeguards article primarily bcause we couldn't agree with the 

 Soviets on a safeguards article that was acceptable to our NATO allies. The prob- 

 lem of negotiating a safeguards article with our NATO allies was as important 

 in our minds as negotiating one with the Soviet Union. 



The principal issue was the relative role of Euratom and the IAEA on safe- 

 guards and on the other side of the coin whether or not the nuclear weapons states 

 accepted any safeguards on their own peaceful nuclear activities. They have been 

 unwilling to do so on the ground that it doesn't relate to the purposes of the 

 treaty. 



aw Keynote remarks of Coneressmnn CraJe TTosmcr hoforc the Symposium on Imple- 

 menting Nuclear Safejruards, Kansas State University, October 25. 1071. In Conqrexaional 

 Record (October 26. 1071). p. TT9002 (Dully edition). 



857 Statemenl of Adrian S. Basher, In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign AfT.-iirs, 

 Hearings, ASmt Control and Disarmament Art Amendments, 1968, op. cit., pp. 59-91. 



"8 Ibid., p. 60. 



