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nuclear power significantly reduce Europe's dependence upon un- 

 certain imports? To what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign 

 policy reflect an objective of reducing a potential trap between demand 

 and supply for energy in Europe? In particular, do present arrange- 

 ments for U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power need updating? 

 What future balance is desirable between a U.S. foreign policy 

 objective of assuring European nations of a reliable, accessible supply 

 of enriched uranium from the United States and a domestic energy 

 policy which might prefer to limit U.S. foreign supply, commitments 

 and thus reduce the need to expand U.S. enrichment capacity I 



CONTROLLING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROLIFERATION 



It is safe to predict that U.S. foreign policy will continue to empha- 

 size the fostering of world peace by international measures to reduce 

 proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly into the hands of less 

 stable nations or other organizations. Questions arising out of this 

 policy posture include : 



To what extent should the United States support the expansion 

 of the safeguards function of the International Atomic Energy 

 Agency ? 



How much is it in the U.S. interest for the IAEA to focus 

 upon safeguards in comparison with its other technical assistance 

 functions ? 



In what way and within what limitations, if any. should the 

 United States fulfill its commitment to place its nuclear industry 

 voluntarily under IAEA safeguards? 



To what extent should U.S. foreign policy attempt to extend 

 the safeguards concept to include physical security of nuclear 

 materials, prevention of their theft, and apprehension of thieves? 

 To what extent should U.S. diplomacy support fulfillment by 

 the nuclear weapons nations of their commitments under the 

 Nonprolifcration Treaty to share benefits of nuclear tcchnology 

 with non-nuclear weapons states? 



DEMONSTRATING THE PRACTICABILITY OF INSPECTION FOR ARMS CONTROL 



U.S. foreign policy supports arms control and disarmament. One 

 critical issue has been that of international inspection to assure the 

 reliability of control. Commercial use of nuclear power in Europe of- 

 fers useful experience with international inspection. To what extent 

 can this experience be used by the United States in its advocacy of 

 arms control ? Would support of IAEA or of Euratom safeguards be 

 more useful in this context ? Would U.S. support of Euratom safe- 

 guards encourage counterpart safeguards through a regional bloc of 

 nations within the Soviet orbit? 



IMPROVING THE U.S. POSITION IN WORLD TRADE 



Assuming that economic losses due to competition from foreign 

 countries whose nuclear power development has been assisted by the 

 United States can be avoided, to what extent can further encourage- 

 ment of commercial nuclear power in Europe, and elsewhere overseas. 



96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 20 



