321 



announced that it would participate in the IGY upon the condition 

 that the Chinese Nationalists would not. Peking participation was 

 accepted by the CSAGI despite this condition, which was essentially 

 ignored as irrelevant since the Nationalist Chinese had not responded 

 to an invitation sent 3 years earlier. In 1956, however, the Nationalist 

 Chinese indicated a desire to participate, demanding that the Peking 

 group be excluded. This demand, which was rejected by the CSAGI, 

 subsequently was withdrawn in 1957, by the Nationalist Chinese, who 

 then officially joined the IGY. The Peking group thereupon withdrew. 

 Sullivan has called this action "... the only case in which the IGY 

 was significantly affected by political considerations." 73 



SOVIET MISSILES 



Political considerations also influenced the extent to which the 

 Soviets released data concerning their Sputnik satellites. It had been 

 agreed among IGY participants that, before the launching of any 

 satellites, certain data would be released, including time of launch; 

 weight, shape, and dimensions of objects placed in orbit; and infor- 

 mation concerning transmission of data and details of orbit. It soon 

 became apparent that the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to release all 

 the agreed-upon information, primarily because military rockets had 

 been used to launch the satellites and it was feared that such infor- 

 mation would disclose military secrets, especially with regard to the 

 location of launch sites. Much discussion during the latter part of the 

 IGY concerned exactly what satellite-related information the Soviets 

 would release. However, the American and Soviet representatives 

 were never able to reach complete agreement on this issue. American 

 representatives, to be sure, were at a decided advantage in that 

 information on Vanguard firings, largely utilizing nonmilitary hard- 

 ware, was quite open and unrestricted by comparison. 



ARCTIC FLIGHTS 



One aspect of Arctic studies centered around the fact that little 

 information was available concerning drifting ice in the Arctic Ocean, 

 sometimes clogging Alaskan waters, sometimes Siberian. Hence, 

 American scientists suggested to Soviet scientists that a cooperative 

 program be established to enable aerial photographic mapping of the 

 Arctic ice packs and their patterns of drift. Soviet scientists accepted 

 the suggestion, proposing that flights be made between Murmansk and 

 Fairbanks, which would permit mapping of the entire Arctic ocean. 

 This suggestion was vetoed in Washington, however, apparently 

 because two important Air Force bases had been built near Fairbanks. 

 Instead, Washington proposed that flights terminate at Nome, a 

 much less satisfactory location than was Fairbanks. Meanwhile, the 

 Hungarian and Suez crises erupted in 1956, and the Soviet reply to 

 the American suggestion of Nome was that the Soviet Air Force 

 would map the Siberian side by itself. Thus, a mixture of political 

 and military considerations prevented the implementation of the 

 scientific program as originally conceived. 



n Sullivan. "The IGY," p. 294. 



