339 



quired for such careers. Furthermore, as Dean Harvey Brooks has 

 pointed out, curriculum reform was largely undertaken for the wrong 

 reason, namely, ". . . on the grounds that it was needed to make 

 our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts," 

 rather than because of a fundamental desire to improve the way in 

 which science was being taught. 146 Thus, while the Sputnik motiva- 

 tion increased interest in science and made changes easier, the danger 

 also existed that both interest and programs might collapse once the 

 motivation subsided. 



PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SCIENCE 



The impact of Sputnik I upon the American public was profound 

 convincing Americans that they no longer possessed an undisputed 

 lead over the rest of the world in science and technology. The Soviet 

 accomplishment "caused a great deal of turmoil in the United States" 

 and was "a real jolt to the complacency of the American people." 147 

 Unlike such previous Soviet successes as the atomic and hydrogen 

 bombs, which Americans could rationalize as having been stolen 

 from them through espionage, no such rationale was possible any 

 longer. Furthermore, the large and shiny rocket that had propelled 

 Sputnik I into the heavens was now circling the earth, clearly visible 

 in the dark sky when illuminated by the rising or setting sun. Large 

 numbers of Americans viewed this speck of light not only with awe, 

 but with a shudder, recognizing the value of rocketry in warmaking. 



Public attitudes were intensified by the extensive publicity given 

 the Soviet achievement. As Chapman observed, "Never before was 

 an international scientific enterprise made so widely known, by press 

 and other publicity, to the parliaments and peoples of the world." 148 

 Detlev W. Bronk, then chairman of the National Science Board, 

 declared that "The fact that . . . the newspapers of our country 

 have given such a tremendous amount of space to the achievements 

 of [the IGY] I think is evidence of the fact that they recognize that 

 the imagination of the peoples of our country, the peoples of the world 

 have been captured by this great adventure." 149 This widespread 

 publicity and public interest, according to the National Science 

 Foundation, made Sputnik I 



... a symbol of competition between Russian and American science, and 

 a sign that we had "lost" a "scientific race." To the extent that the symbol 

 became identified with such a "race," it was erroneous and destructive — we did 

 not think of the undertaking in these terms, but regarded it as a part of a coopera- 

 tive international scientific undertaking, the International Geophysical Year." 15 ° 



This universal concern helped focus public attitudes upon the 

 necessity for basic research, as well as its value. As stated further 

 by the NSF, 



144 Harvey Brooks, "Impact of the Defense Establishment on Science and Education." In: U.S., Con- 

 gress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop- 

 ment, National Science Policy. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 666, 91st Cong.. 2d sess., July, August, and Septeiu* 

 ber 1970, p. 962. 



147 See The Evolution of International Technology, vol. II, p. 633. 



"« Chapman, "International Cooperation," p. 178. 



i" NSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 4. 



»*> NSF Eighth Annual Report, p. 3. 



