399 



development of lagging regions of the world. Following World War 

 II, the general endorsement of self-determination was applied more 

 explicitly, in the face of Soviet expansionism, toward the goal of con- 

 taining "world communism." This goal was also rather explicitly re- 

 lated to the accepted U.S. practice of aiding the developing countries 

 of the world. 



In a discussion before the American Foreign Service Association on 

 June 23, 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussed the Vietnamese 

 conflict in relation to these and other objectives of U.S. foreign policy. 

 In this conflict, he said, the traditional U.S. objective of encouraging 

 self-determination by peoples of their own forms of government was 

 combined with the more recent objective of containing the spread of 

 world communism. Said the Secretary : 



In Vietnam today we face one more challenge in the long line of dangers we 

 have, unhappily, had to meet and master for a generation. We have had to show 

 both strength and restraint — courage and coolness — for Iran and for Greece, for 

 Berlin and for Korea, in the Formosa Strait, and in the Cuban missile crisis.* 2 



Another longstanding element of U.S. foreign policy is that one- 

 nation dominance of either Europe or Asia should be prevented. 43 

 The logic of this position is that — apart from the obvious economic 

 and commercial consequences — the natural and human resources of 

 either continent, mobilized under a single competent and hostile man- 

 agement, could threaten U.S. security. The relation of this position to 

 the Vietnamese conflict was implied by Secretary Rusk as follows : 



As I have said, Hanoi is presently adamant against negotiation or any avenue 

 to peace. Peiping [sic] is even more so, and one can plainly read the declared 

 doctrine and purpose of the Chinese Communists. They are looking beyond the 

 current conflict to the hope of domination in all of Southeast Asia — and indeed 

 beyond. 44 



The Secretary also rejected both the possibility of a nuclear conflict, 

 with all its awesome possibilities, and also U.S. abandonment of the 

 contest : 



A few — a very few — may believe that unlimited war can take the place of the 

 sustained and steady effort in which we are engaged, just as there may be a 

 few — a very few — who think we should pull out and leave a friendly people to 

 their fate. But the American people want neither rashness nor surrender. 45 



The Secretary then introduced the theme of American support for 

 national self-determination by summarizing a statement of goals by 

 the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam, which included "Freedom for 

 South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny in con- 

 formity with democratic principles and without any foreign interfer- 



.^P ean Rusk . "Viet -Nam: Four Steps to Peace," Department of State Bulletin (July 12 

 1965), pp. 50-55. 



« On this point see : Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: a Strategy for 

 American Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1969). Gordon, Southeast 

 Asia Project Chairman, Research Analysis Corporation, writes, p. 13 : "The reason for 

 these repeated involvements [of the United States] In East Asian affairs [Japanese War 

 Korean War, and Vietnamese War] is to be found in principles nearly identical with those 

 on which the U.S. has operated in Europe. Washington has been unwilling, in other words, 

 to accept an East Asian structure under the main influence, or dominance, of any single 

 power. For this reason, the post-World War II period in East Asia has been characterized 

 by a continuation of the bipolar conflict that began in 1915. For China, under Mao has 

 appeared to aim for East Asian hegemony, and the United States — having successfully 

 opposed Japan's efforts of achieving that goal — has been unwilling to accept China in her 

 place." 



** Rusk, "Vietnam : Four Steps to Peace," p. 52. 



"Ibid., p. 54. 



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