410 



issue — for example, the Pathet Lao has been agreeable to the Nam 

 Ngum construction, and interferences with the various working groups 

 and construction projects have been few and apparently inadvertent. 

 However, sustained commitment of resources and manpower to long- 

 range development projects is difficult to reconcile with the fact of the 

 spreading conflict in Southeast Asia. The expectations in 1965 that the 

 war would wind down in perhaps another four years had been a factor 

 in President Johnson's calculation ; he had apparently judged the time 

 ripe in April of 1965 to encourage thought about planning for postwar 

 development, if only as a self-fulfilling prophecy in hastening the end- 

 ing of the war. A similar outlook, at the end of 1966, appears to have 

 motivated his appointment of the Lilienthal mission. 



Postwar Planning in Vietnam : the Thuc-Lilienthal Report 



As an evidence of President Johnson's continuing interest in region- 

 alism as applicable to Southeast Asia was his action of December 16, 

 1966 in appointing David E. Lilienthal to head a regional planning 

 mission to Vietnam. Lilienthal had come into national attention in the 

 mid-1980s as general manager and then chairman of TVA, and subse- 

 quently chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. After re- 

 tiring from public service in 1950, he had organized the Development 

 and Resources Corporation, a private venture to aid developing coun- 

 tries in their regional planning. The Lilienthal mission to Vietnam 

 was originally conceived as a postwar planning venture. 64 After his 

 appointment to the task, Lilienthal went to South Vietnam on a short 

 reconnaissance visit, accompanied by Robert W. Komer, special as- 

 sistant to President .Johnson. Upon their return they held a joint press 

 conference at the White House with President Johnson on Febru- 

 ary 27, 1967. In describing his views of their mission, the President 

 explained : 



From the early stage of the TVA I have . . . admired the novel, constructive, 

 and farreaching thoughts and programs which (Lilienthal) has inaugurated on 

 behalf of people in a democratic way and in a democratic society. 



We finally prevailed on him to go out and do some studying (in Vietnam). . . . 

 He has given us his help. I think it will have farreaching results and effects/ 

 It is going to be essential to our success in that area. 



This goes back to what was said in Baltimore in April of 1965. . . . 



Later in the interview, the President again interjected — 



Some of this thinking is reflected in the Baltimore speech of April of 1965. 

 That will be brought up to date. We have worked some with some of the United 

 Nations people and some of our own economic people since that time. Of course. 

 we talked to Mr. (Eugene) Black about the agreed deal with the Asian Devel- 

 opment Hunk and the economic development of that whole part of the world. 



Mr. Komer stressed the postwar development theme — 



Everywhere I traveled in the country there was a feeling that the outcome of 

 this conflict w;is no Longer in doubt. . . . There is a growing mood of confidence in 

 South Vietnam. 



Mr. Lilienthal's contribution to the conference was centered on the 



" l At the Manila Conference, October 1966, a statement was Issued In a Joint Com- 

 munique (State Department Bulletin, November i!>. 1966, p. 732) that read: "Looking to 

 the long-term future of their richly endowed country, the Vietnamese representatives de 

 scribed their views and plans for the building of an expanded postwar economy." This 

 led to the action by President Johnson, announced December 1G, that the United States 

 Oovernmenl and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam would sponsor a joint plan- 

 nine effort on the "long run development of the Vietnamese economy." at the request of 

 Prime Minister Kv (This was reported in Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1967, 

 p. 69). 



