412 



authors in resolving the issue of a postwar versus a more broadly de- 

 fined "futures" study. The Rand analysis concluded : 



The whole environment in Vietnam is in a state of transition. There are 

 numerous important current trends: Americans are leaving; Vietnamese are 

 assuming more of the defense burden ; security is improving ; and the economy 

 is growing. These trends do not lead directly to peace. All are favorable, though 

 some may be reversible. Their continuity will not be assured by favorable eco- 

 nomic performance, but such performance will be reinforcing. 



The Thuc-Lilienthal report had recommended a large-scale, capital- 

 intensive water project which, said the Rand analysis, "seems precisely 

 the kind of project that is unlikely to be undertaken until the national 

 budget is relieved of some of the burdens of the national security and 

 until the GVN (Government of Vietnam) top managers become less 

 preoccupied with the war." Earlier, the Rand analysis, in discussing 

 the report's suggestions for a large public investment program, 

 commented : 



The discussion of sectoral investment priorities argues against favoring the 

 industrial sector at the expense of agriculture. This is doubtless good advice to 

 a country with the resource endowments of South Vietnam, no matter what 

 investment environment, but the case seems particularly strong in the environ- 

 ment postulated here. In the first place, the success of Vietnamization almost 

 surely hinges on the continuation of the favorable security developments in the 

 Mekong Delta, the richest agricultural region. Thus agricultural investment will 

 be the safest kind — security-wise — during the next five years. Secondly, agricul- 

 tural capital formation in Vietnam is largely comprised of widespread mecha- 

 nization of relatively small enterprises. Thus the capital goods are spread out and 

 are less suitable as hostages for enemy objectives. Finally, small scale agricul- 

 tural investment is very conserving of GVN management . . . ." 



The Thuc-Lilienthal study also, by implication, posed the question 

 as to how planning for the Lower Mekong Basin as a geographic and 

 developmental entity was to be reconciled with planning in the sep- 

 arate Riparian States. Parts of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, and 

 most of South Vietnam, lay outside the Basin. The complications of 

 planning a coherent and balanced program of development of the 

 Basin, with active military conflict in three of the countries, seem 

 formidable. Logically, most of the active construction was in single 

 nations and on tributaries. It was important that each of the four 

 Riparian States should be assigned some equitable share of these, as 

 well as contributing some equitable share of the total costs. 



The Thuc-Lilienthal study apparently recognized— as did the Rand 

 Corporation analysis of it— that the form taken by the conflict and 

 the manner of its termination would be an important determinant of 

 the appropriateness of any development plan. The primary value of 

 the Thuc-Lilienthal survey lay in its description of the Mekong Delta 

 as a populous and potentially rich region, and their analysis of the 

 economic problems and opportunities in other parts of Vietnam. How- 

 ever, as the war continued to expand into Laos and Cambodia .(i.e., 

 Khmer Republic), the problems of planning for future economic de- 

 velopment in these countries might be expected to resemble those of 

 South Vietnam. 



In fact, as the war spread, more and more of the total activity on 

 the Mekong— as distinguished from planning and "pre-investment" 

 work— tended to take place in Thailand. Although attention had 



* Williams, "South Vietnam's Development Prospects," p. 19. 



