413 



earlier been called repeatedly to the remarkable freedom from inter- 

 ference enjoyed by those working on the Mekong Project, the report 

 of the Coordination Committee for 1971 makes numerous men- 

 tion of projects retarded by the "security" problems and the unsettled 

 conditions. 70 



The piling up of studies in the face of compelled inaction on con- 

 struction may help to ensure more thorough examination of the total 

 system before it turns into a reality. However, the delay must also be a 

 source of frustration not only in Bangkok but also in the three other 

 national capitals, and at the long-promised construction sites. 



Action on the Large Main Stem Projects 



Early in its history, and particularly from 1957 onward, the Co- 

 ordination Committee repeatedly characterized the three main stem 

 dam projects — at Pa Mong, Sambor, and Tonle Sap — as its "priority" 

 items of construction. The Pa Mong unit in particular was favored 

 because of its enormous potential for alleviating downstream floods, 

 as well as its irrigation and power features. Responsibility for plan- 

 ning the Pa Mong dam, by agreement between the Committee and 

 U.S.A.I.D., was assigned to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. An 

 elaborate series of studies followed. In the most recent of these, the 

 "Pa Mong Stage One Feasibility Report, 1970," the Bureau concluded 

 with the following passage : 



One of the most frequently asked questions during the course of the investiga- 

 tions leading to this report is : When will Pa Mong Project be built? 



Pa Mong Project will probably be built when the Riparian countries, especially 

 Laos and Thailand, decide that they need the project and that it fits their na- 

 tional development requirements as well as or better than any alternative. When 

 and how the project fits into their development plans will presumably be based 

 on decisions as to the best use of development resources including funds and 

 manpower, and a determination of how to best meet their development needs. 



One of the first questions to be resolved insofar as Pa Mong is concerned is : 

 Are the products of Pa Mong, i.e., power, increased agricultural production, 

 corollary effects, and the human benefits, needed in the development scheme and 

 if so, what are the orders of priority? 



The conclusion was suggested that the project might be activated at a 

 "much earlier date" if it could be set up on a self-liquidating basis 

 "with a management organization having authority to (1) negotiate 

 loans, (2) monitor expenditures, (3) control operation and mainte- 

 nance so as to produce maximum sustained revenues, and (4) control 

 revenues for most expeditious debt service. . . ." 



A separate examination of the question as to the timing of main stem 

 projects was undertaken in 1970 by Resources for the Future, Inc., 

 at the request of the World Bank. Specifically, RFF was asked to ex- 

 amine the Amplified Basin Plan Report of the Coordination Commit- 

 tee, completed in 1970, with respect to development strategy and pri- 

 orities in the region as they might affect agriculture. 



The findings of the RFF report 71 were that despite the substantial 

 effort in research and "impact studies," there were still many serious 

 gaps. These included : the role of electric power, the ecological conse- 



70 In the draft report, references to this problem appear on pases 21, 22, 23. 36-37, 40, 42, 

 59, and 74. On the subject of war disruption in the Republic of Viet Nam see U.S. Congress.' 

 Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, "Impact of the Vietnam War," (Washington D.C. : 

 U.S. Government Printing Office. 1971), 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1971. 



71 Resources for the Future, Agricultural Development in the Mekong Basin: Goals, Pri- 

 orities, and Strategies (Baltimore, Md. : Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). 



