421 



However, unlike his predecessor, President Nixon stressed the de- 

 sirability of a low U.S. "profile" in Asian affairs. 



Before Mr. Nixon acceded to the Presidency, he offered a strategy 

 of U.S. diplomacy toward Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia, after 

 the conclusion of the war in Vietnam. The war, he said, had com- 

 manded too great a share of U.S. attention. Meanwhile — 



Sometimes dramatically, but more often quietly, the rest of Asia has been 

 undergoing a profound, an exciting and on balance an extraordinarily promising 

 transformation. One key to this transformation is the emergence of Asian re- 

 gionalism . . . .*" 



He continued : 



The developing coherence of Asian regional thinking is reflected in a disposi- 

 tion to consider problems and loyalties in regional terms, and to evolve regional 

 approaches to development needs and to the evolution of a new world order. This 

 is not excessively chauvinistic, but rather in the nature of a coalescing con- 

 fidence, a recognition that Asia can become a counterbalance to the West, and an 

 increasing disposition to seek Asian solutions to Asian problems through coopera- 

 tive action. 80 



There was also a sense of common danger, the source of which was 

 Communist China. Regionalism was a means of repelling this danger. 

 It was also a means to avert direct confrontations between the nuclear 

 powers by minimizing the number of "occasions on which the great 

 powers have to decide whether or not to commit their forces." These, 

 he said, "can be reduced by the development of regional defense pacts, 

 in which nations undertake, among themselves, to attempt to contain 

 aggression in their own areas." 81 



At the same time, the nations of Asia — through their governments — 

 were "consciously, deliberately, and programmatically developing in 

 the direction of greater liberty, greater abundance, broader choice, and 

 increased popular involvement in the processes of government." This, 

 too, was a regional process but it was one in which the Asian nations 

 themselves had to take the lead. The diplomatic role of the United 

 States, in encouraging this development, needed to be low in profile. 



In a design for Asia's future, there is no room for heavy-handed American 

 pressures ; there is need for subtle encouragement of the kind of Asian initia- 

 tives that help bring the design to reality. The distinction may seem superficial, 

 but in fact it is central both to the kind of Asia we want and to the effectiveness 

 of the means of achieving it. The central pattern of the future U.S.-Asian rela- 

 tions must be American support for Asian initiatives. 82 



Regionalism for National Security and Economic Development 



Upon coming to the Presidency, Richard Nixon developed further 

 his concept of regionalism as a means of economic development and 

 national security. In supporting a "soft-loan" capability for the Asian 

 Development Bank — after an extended study of the subject — he urged 

 that the United States "should join with other donor countries in es- 

 tablishing this Special Fund, and strengthen the Bank so that it can 

 better deal with Asia's current development problems and future 

 needs." 83 



78 Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, 46, no. 1 (October 1967), 

 p. 111. 



80 Ibid., p. 113. 



81 JMtf., p. 114-115. 



82 Ibid., pp. 117-118, 124. 



83 "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid," May 1969, Public Papers of the 

 President of the United States (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 

 pp. 411-417. 



