VI. Issues, Problems, and Opportunities Offered by 

 World Regionalism 



The whole history of the Mekong Project shows a trend from a 

 simple public works program to a program in which construction is 

 linked to the readiness of the region to accept and use rationally the 

 electricity, irrigation water, and accompanying economic stimulus the 

 Project would provide. Of progressively greater consequence is the 

 question of compatibility of new engineering structures with the cul- 

 ture, ecology, economy, technical expertise, management skills, and 

 political organization of the component units of the region. Origi- 

 nally, regionalism — as practiced in the Tennessee Valley — was seen as 

 a concept to accelerate development of resources on a coherent basis. 

 But as emphasis was intensified on coherence of comprehensive plan- 

 ning, the elements of speed and efficiency, while still present, assumed 

 a secondary importance. 



U.S. policy toward the Mekong Project can be approached in a 

 number of ways. First, it can be regarded as an element of U.S. na- 

 tional security policy in the sense that it is a move toward building a 

 more unified regional complex of countries as a counterbalance to 

 Mainland China and the presence of the U.S.S.R. in Asia, as well as to 

 a revitalized Japan. Second, it can be regarded as a point of departure 

 toward a limitless variety of forms of economic assistance to a develop- 

 ing region ; also, as a mechanism for shifting the costly burden of aid- 

 ing developing countries to a less onerous multilateral arrangement 

 with more sharing of costs among the developed countries (and a 

 "lower profile" of each individual donor). Third, as a very longrange 

 diplomatic strategy, the concept of "world regionalism" perhaps offers 

 a way to restructure national political forces into economically bal- 

 anced regions, sharing interests and problems, but with lessened levels 

 of interregional conflict and tensions while building viable regional 

 systems of economic and technological development, interregional 

 t .ra.de, and mutual assistance. 



Southeast Asia As a Regional Security Bloc 



One analyst of U.S. policy in Asia observes that the "fifty-year 

 global behavior pattern of the United States indicates that it will 

 accept general war rather than tolerate [the achievement by any na- 

 tion of "final dominance on Europe and East Asia"]." 92 



This observation is given support by the flat statement by President 

 Johnson, October 17, 1966, that "No single nation can or should be 

 permitted to dominate the Pacific region." 93 



93 Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign 

 Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 14-15. 



88 "Additional Documentation on President Johnson's Trip to Asia," Department of State 

 Bulletin (November 28, 1966), p. 815. 



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