430 



It is also possible that the various brands of communism in China 

 and Southeast Asia might learn to accept some of the features of the 

 Mekong Project. Attention has been called by Mekong Project en- 

 thusiasts on numerous occasions to the fact that local communist fac- 

 tions (explicitly the Pathet Lao, and by implication others) have at 

 least tolerated Mekong development activities. The Mekong arrange- 

 ment does not do violence to the communist solicitude for national 

 sovereignty. No "supranational" authority is involved. The general 

 thrust of current Mekong Committee studies is toward accommodation 

 of physical works to the broadest possible base of social need and 

 utility. Possible sources of disaffection will always be likely to arise, 

 but in general the Mekong style has been toward goals to provide for 

 widely distributed economic advances in the region, balanced against 

 maximum political neutrality and colorlessness. 



Global Regionalism as a Long-Range Means Toward U.S. Diplomatic 

 Goals 



Nearly seven years have elapsed since President Johnson made his 

 billion-dollar offer to support regional development in Southeast Asia. 

 The work on the Mekong, at first stimulated by the offer and accom- 

 panying measures of support, has settled back to a more deliberate 

 pace. Hampered by spreading conflict, the work has been unable to 

 achieve the balanced benefits among countries the Coordination Com- 

 mittee sees as its guiding principle. The prospect is that until the polit- 

 ical unrest in Laos, Khmer Republic, and Vietnam has subsided there 

 will continue to be delays, postponements, and unbalance. To some ex- 

 tent, however, this may be a blessing in disguise: it compels postpone- 

 ment of engineering works not only on the main stem but also the tribu- 

 taries of the Mekong, compels more intensive examination of poten- 

 tially socially disruptive consequences, and affords opportunity for 

 recruitment and training of Riparian personnel in the countless skills 

 needed for the action phase of development. 



Manifestly, the contribution of the Mekong Project to an easing 

 of the Vietnamese conflict has not been significant or even measurable. 

 The determined nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict 

 has remained obdurately aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an 

 alternative to a prospective ultimate victory. Notably also, Prince 

 Sihanouk of Cambodia adopted a not dissimilar stance, apparently 

 fearing that any U.S. -led or sponsored regional aid scheme might 

 entail dangerous compromises and reduced freedom of self-determina- 

 tion. Accordingly, as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of 

 cooperation in a regional development scheme does not present a con- 

 vincing opportunity. 



It is interesting to speculate on what different course events in 

 Southeast Asia might have followed had the Johnson offer been made 

 at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 that partitioned Vietnam. 

 Willard Hanna's comment about the Mekong Project is appropriate in 

 this context : 



In a region in which discontinuity, it outright sabotage, of international en- 

 deavor has heretofore prevailed, the Mekong Project may provide the long- 

 sought-for new formula for sustained, constructive development. Here, in the 



