APPENDIX 



Comments by Eugene R. Black on Topics Related to this Study — 



March 14, 1972 



An assessment of the political impact, short- and long-range, of the Johns Hopkins 

 speech on the leadership and professional community in the ''Riparian 

 States"* 

 While impossible to measure with any precision, there is little doubt in my 

 mind that the political impact of President Johnson's offer of large-scale post- 

 war assistance to Southeast Asia was substantial. I say Southeast Asia rather 

 than the "riparian States" because the offer of assistance was not confined to 

 them. I believe the President intended and I acted as though Southeast Asia 

 covered the five Mekong countries — Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and both Viet- 

 nams — and Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. And I 

 considered the $1 billion offer to be more symbolic than mathematically precise. 

 My visits and contacts included all of these countries except North Vietnam. 

 Both an immediate and short-range political impact of our offer was its positive 

 role as a catalyst in stimulating the interest in and moves toward regional co- 

 operation. While nationalism is, of course, the dominant political force in the 

 region, this is now tempered by a fairly widely accepted view that the states of 

 Southeast Asia have a common interest in working together for political, eco- 

 nomic and even cultural reasons. Many of the regional organizations and group- 

 ings in Southeast Asia owe their origin or vitality to the boost for regional coop- 

 eration given by the United States in the period 1965-1969. Best known is the for- 

 mation in late 1965 of the Asian Development Bank. While the idea for such a 

 bank had been around for several years and ECAFE circles favored it, its forma- 

 tion in 1965 resulted directly from President Johnson's April 7 general offer to 

 Southeast Asia and his July offer to propose the U.S. join such a bank, if formed, 

 which I was able to convey to a special meeting of Asian bankers in Bangkok. 

 Less recognized but no less real was the large increase in inter-regional personal 

 contacts which occurred in Southeast Asia over these years at various levels and 

 in varied forums. I have in mind such developments as the initiation of plans for 

 a regionwide study of transportation infrastructure ( the study was completed in 

 1971 with help of the ADB) ; the coming together of Ministers of Education of the 

 region to plan development of training institutions of regional significance and 

 the mushrooming of specialized regional groups to consider one topic or an- 

 other of economic, social or political significance. As for the Mekong "riparian 

 States," they have participated in most of this region-wide activity plus, of course, 

 made progress in further developing plans for harnessing the resources from the 

 river itself. The Johns Hopkins speech and the stepped-up interest in the de- 

 velopment potential of the Mekong which it generated certainly had a healthy, 

 political impact in the non-communist riparian states by focussing attention on 

 the future. I know this from my four trips to the area for President Johnson 

 and subsequent visits. While I did not visit North Vietnam, I understand from 

 C. L. Sulzberger's trip to Hanoi and other accounts that some political figures 

 there were quite interested in the possibility of sharing in the proposed major de- 

 velopment effort. At the same time it was as unrealistic in 1905 as it is today 

 to believe that leaders in North Vietnam [bent] on conquest of the South would 

 abandon their goals simply in response to offers of aid. I would, therefor, rephrase 

 your question a little and say both the short and long-term political impact of the 



*The headings in italics define the topics, relating to the present study, on which the 

 author asked Mr. Black to comment. See vol. I, p. 370 for context. 



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