513 



A nation cou'd control the surface of the oceans without having a single ship. 

 The required system would involve satellites equipped with a variety of sensors 

 that would maintain coverage of the world's oceans. Satellites would relay the in- 

 formation to a central computer system which would then target the land-based 

 missiles on ships to be destroyed. The missiles would then be equipped with ter- 

 minal guidance or be under direct control of the satellite and land-based computer 

 systems. While it is most unlikely that any nation would adopt such a strategy, 

 this example illustrates the fact that naval posture may change radically in the 

 future. 11 ' 



MacDonald also postulates future placement of missiles as large as 

 the Polaris, or larger, on a relatively shallow shelf floor in a barge sys- 

 tem that could be moved occasionally to prevent its detection. Another 

 possibility would be mobile ocean bottom systems which crawl or creep 

 on the seabed. The technology and engineering requirements for man- 

 ning, maintaining, and servicing these installations would not differ 

 from those used in offshore mineral exploration and exploitation. In 

 fact, even if bottom installations were not militarily desirable (under- 

 water mobility being the key advantage), the thrust into deeper 

 waters of the continental shelf by the petroleum industry might 

 eventually require some kind of protection by the United States, and 

 the Navy might be called on to provide it. 



In shaping U.S. policy for the disarmament of the seabed the effect 

 of technology was much in evidence. The banning of fixed bottom 

 installations did not pose any dangers, particularly when the United 

 States had come to realize the importance of mobility for its under- 

 water deterrent systems. In testimony before Senator Pell's Subcom- 

 mittee on Ocean Space, the following exchange took place : 



Senator Pell. Do you have any concern about moving in terms of prohibiting 

 mobile weapons systems from operating on the seabed? 



Dr. [Robert W.] Moese. No ; I do not really — otherwise I think we may end 

 up banning things that do not have any military use and certainly we can get 

 widespread agreement on that. One has to remember that the great advantage of 

 deploying a weapons system at sea is mobility, and that if one bans only fixed 

 nuclear weapons systems at sea he may well be banning something that doesn't 

 have any value anyway. 115 



Essentially, if the Polaris and Poseidon systems were to be anchored 

 at fixed points, they would not represent the threat they pose as mobile 

 systems. The United States had apparently abandoned interest in 

 fixed nuclear installations on the sea bottom, and there is evidence 

 to indicate that the decision to develop post-Polaris deterrent systems 

 rather than fixed nuclear installations had been reached long before 

 the denuclearization of the seabed was considered on the international 

 disarmament agenda. 116 This does not mean, however, that the Navy 

 was not using the sea bottom. In testimony before Representative 

 Dante Fascell's Subcommittee on International Organizations and 

 Movements, Dr. Robert Frosch was asked to describe some of the 

 Navy undertakings which might be involved in the Malta proposal. 

 Dr. Frosch answered "* * * that the Navy has used the sea bottom 



114 Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "An American Strategy for the Oceans." In American 

 Assembly. "Uses of the Seas." (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968), pages 

 183-4. • 



115 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "Activities of Nations in 

 Ocean Space." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Ocean Space of the ... on S. Res. 33, 

 91st Congress, first session, July 24, 25, 28, and 30, 1969. (Washington, U.S. Government 

 Printing Office. 1969). pages 45-6. 



116 Jozef Goldblat. "The militarization of the deep ocean : the sea-bed treaty." In "SIPRI 

 Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/1970." (Stockholm, Stockholm 

 International Peace Research Institute, 1970), page 176. 



