539 



Congress for enactment of a law providing most-favored-nation treat- 

 ment for the Soviet Union. 



The various executive department delegations to the Soviet Union 

 did not include congressional representation, nor was the Summit 

 meeting attended by representatives of Congress. Moreover, the bi- 

 partisan official visits to China by congressional leaders were not 

 repeated in the wake of the Moscow Summit, and the Joint U.S.- 

 U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission set up at the Summit did not include 

 congressional representation. Finally, the Peterson Report in August 

 1972 on the first meeting of the Commission made no direct reference 

 to Congress. 



The absence of congressional participation in U.S.-Soviet negotia- 

 tions was in contrast with trade negotiations conducted under the 

 authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1873). 

 Section 243 of that Act stipulated that four members of Congress (two 

 members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and two of the 

 Senate Committee on Finance) must be accredited as members of the 

 U.S. delegation to trade negotiations authorized by the Act. 



Congress necessarily will be involved in certain aspects of U.S.- 

 Soviet economic relations in the future. Congressional approval is 

 required for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union. More- 

 over, Congress may be asked to consider new arrangements to facilitate 

 U.S.-Soviet trade, such as expansion of U.S. Government credit 

 facilities. 



Trade and Diplomacy 



Increased trade has generally been assumed to encourage more ami- 

 cable and stable relations among nations. U.S. economic relations with 

 the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have specifically been assumed 

 to be an effective lever to further U.S. national interests. For example, 

 after World War II, U.S. leaders proposed including the Soviet Union 

 and East European countries in the Marshall Plan for European re- 

 covery, presumably in return for adherence to U.S. views on the politi- 

 cal settlements in Eastern Europe and other matters. U.S. leaders also 

 specifically linked economic benefits from trade to assured access routes 

 in the settlement of the 1948 Berlin Crisis. Again, Communist coun- 

 tries were apparently denied equal commercial relations because of 

 their participation in the Korean War and their repressive domestic 

 policies. Withdrawal of MFN status and imposition of export controls 

 Avere among the penalties applied by U.S. policymakers. Later Yugo- 

 slavia and Poland were rewarded for their independence from Soviet 

 domination and for a degree of moderation in domestic policies by a 

 moderating of U.S. foreign trade policy. Romania has also been sin- 

 gled out on various occasions for less restrictive commercial treatment 

 in recognition of its relatively independent foreign policy. Thus, 

 changes in U.S. foreign economic policy toward the Soviet Union and 

 Eastern Europe have been used for a number of political ends deemed 

 consistent with U.S. foreign policy. Overarching the specific applica- 

 tions of economic leverage has been the general attitude that the Com- 

 munist nations were enemies of the United States and should be de- 



