558 



and in selected areas of civilian technology surest the need for re- 

 assessing that assumption. 



Another important question involves the ability of U.S. companies 

 to compete with other Western exporters in sales of high-technology 

 products to the Soviet Union. In view of evidence of the loss of Amer- 

 ican technological leadership in many areas to Japan and Western 

 Europe, why should Soviet importers prefer the United States to other 

 Western sources? Two hypotheses may help to explain an apparent 

 Soviet inclination to expand trade with the United States — especially 

 in high-technology products. First, there is a traditional Soviet view 

 that American technology is the best. Second, and perhaps more per- 

 suasive, U.S. technology and the ability of U.S. industry to deal in 

 large projects is attractive. Specifically in areas such as petroleum and 

 natural gas development, computer systems, and agribusiness the abil- 

 ity of the United States to supply the latest technology and the neces- 

 sary credit .facilities are demonstrably superior. 



U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO 194 6 



Most students of Soviet economic development agree that foreign 

 technology played an important role in Soviet industrialization. In 

 the pre-World War II period. Soviet industries imported advanced 

 Western machinery and equipment, purchased foreign technical in- 

 formation, and employed industrial specialists from the West. Ameri- 

 can technology was imported and applied in many sectors of the Soviet 

 economy. The U.S. -Soviet technology transfer continued during the 

 war. largely through the Lend-Lease program. 



Antony Sutton, who has published comprehensive studies on West- 

 ern technology and Soviet economic development, has concluded thf>* 

 "Western technical assistance was the major causal factor in Soviet eco- 

 nomic growth for the period 1928-1945. '" r>2 Sutton's conclusion differs 

 somewhat from the findings of other scholars and may overstate Soviet 

 dependence on Western technology. Richard Moorsteen and Raymond 

 Powell, for example, concluded in a 1966 study that the major part of 

 Soviet economic growth can be attributed to increments of capital and 

 labor, rather than technological progress. 63 



Nevertheless, the importance of the technology transfer from the 

 United States and other Western countries is undeniable. Certainly, 

 the high regard for U.S. technology is well documented in Soviet 

 sources. For example, the admiration of the American engineer Hugh 

 Cooper, who supervised the building of both Muscle Shoals (a dam 

 on the main stream of the Tennessee River) and the Dnepr River 

 hydroelectric system (a key project in the Soviet First Five-Year 

 Plan) was symbolic of the Soviet view of American technical assist- 

 ance. Moreover, the American approach to mass production in 

 machine-building was chosen in the First Five-Year Plan over the 

 European small-scale operations. The Soviet tractor and automobile 

 industry were applications of American mass production techniques. 6 * 

 U.S. technological contributions were frequently acknowledged by 



•"Antony Sutton. Wentern Tcchnoloau and Soviet Economic Development , vol. II : 1910- 

 19iS (Stanford : Hoover Institution Press. 1071). p. 330. 



"Richard Moorsteen and Ravmond P. Powell. The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962 

 (Homewood. 111. : Richard I) Irwin. Inc.. 1966). 



"* David Granlck. Soviet Metal Fabricating and Economic Development (Madison: Uni- 

 versity of Wisconsin Press, 1907). pp. 24. 40, 41. 



