578 



been used to regulate trade with North Korea, the People's Republic of 

 China, and North Vietnam (it no longer applies to trade with ( 'hina). 



On August 29, 1972, the Export Administration Act was extended 

 and amended. The new law called for further relaxation of controls 

 on exports freely available from sources outside the United States. It 

 also directed the Secretary of Commerce to report to the President and 

 to the Congress on the progress of export control liberalization. 



A number of laws regulate the export of specific commodities to 

 the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Among these are the 

 Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1934. 1970) which authorizes 

 the President to restrict the exportation to any nation of arms, muni- 

 tions, implements of war. and related technology. Another such law is 

 the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, :ls 

 amended (7 U.S.C. 1691-l736d, 1970) which prohibits sales agree- 

 ments on agricultural commodities for local currencies or long-term 

 dollar credit to some Communist countries. 



The United States also attempts to coordinate its strategic export 

 controls with the foreign trade policies of its XATO allies (except 

 Iceland) and Japan. In 1949. a Consultative Group of seven countries 

 (later increased to 15) set up the Coordinating Committee ( COCOM) 

 to discuss the embargo and control lists that the members were to 

 apply in their trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Euro- 

 pean' countries. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 19~>1 

 or "Battle Act*' (22 U.S.C. 1611 et se<]., 1970) provides the legisla- 

 tive basis for U.S. support of the coordinated approach to export 

 controls. 



The Battle Act (subsequently amended in 1961) not only prohibits 

 the export of implements of war, atomic energy materials, and other 

 strategic commodities to Communist countries, but also provides that 

 all U.S. military, economic, or financial assistance be denied to any 

 nation that knowingly permits shipment of such goods to the Commu- 

 nist Bloc. Although the President may waive this provision if he 

 finds it in the national interest, its enactment provided him with a 

 bargaining tool for persuading other countries to apply the strategic 

 embargo. 



As COCOM has no formal charter, its decisions are not binding on 

 member countries. Rather, it is an advisory board which issue< rec- 

 ommendations of goods to be embargoed or controlled. These are re 

 garded as minimum li-ts to which each member might add commodi- 

 ties. Since its inception, COCOM has steadily reduced its list of 

 embargoed items. The U.S. Commodity Control List has considerably 

 more controlled items than COCOM's International List. Perhaps be 

 cause of their traditional trade ties with the Soviet Union and other 

 East European Communist countries, the other members of COCOM 

 have consistently lobbied for fewer controls, while the United States 

 has favored more. For example, Japan and the European NATO 

 countries have exported advanced electronics, communications and 

 transport equipment, and many other items that are still prohibited 

 for export in t he I nited States. 



The COCOM liberalization of export controls has been paralleled 

 (at a much slower rate) by the trend in U.S. export control policy. 



