605 



Other industrial nations such as France and Japan have developed 

 counterparts of Soviet institutions in order to accommodate the Soviet 

 state trading monopoly. U.S. leaders may prefer to encourage more 

 institutional changes on the part of the Soviet Union. 



IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN U.S. PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR 

 ADMINISTRATION AND NEGOTIATION 



To maximize the net economic and political benefits to the United 

 States, the negotiating process and the mechanism for commercial 

 relations (i.e., U.S. membership in the Joint Commercial Commis- 

 sion), should be reevaluated. In order to link the broadest security and 

 diplomatic interests with the commercial arrangements, the involve- 

 ment of high-level policymakers is essential. Specialists on the Soviet 

 Union, foreign trade specialists, and private businessmen are also in- 

 dispensable to provide guidance in their areas of expertise. 



The long-term process of negotiation, its specialized character, and 

 the broad national interests inherent in U.S.-Soviet relations require a 

 permanent working blend of experienced people with the following 

 characteristics : 



a. Top politicians from both executive and legislative branches, 

 authorized to speak for the White House and Congress as a whole; 



b. Governmental trade specialists from the Departments of Com- 

 merce, Treasury, State^ and other agencies. 



c. Specialists on Soviet political -economic affairs from governmental 

 or academic positions ; and 



d. Representatives of private business and banking. 



The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks team in SALT I was appar- 

 ently successful in combining the appropriate elements of authority 

 and expertise. The Soviet SALT team was roughly representative of 

 opposite numbers. In negotiations between different systems it is not 

 easy to make such comparisons. For example, the Supreme Soviet, the 

 Soviet legislature, need not be represented, as it does not have the 

 power or responsibility of the U.S. Congress. In the U.S. system of 

 checks and balances, on the other hand, it would be particularly bene- 

 ficial to include Members of Congress in the commercial negotiations. 



Congressional involvement would permit a broader representation 

 of U.S. public opinion and facilitate passage of legislative measures 

 needed to improve U.S.-Soviet commercial relations. Without continu- 

 ous involvement of the Congress and private interests, it could be diffi- 

 cult to have an informed debate on important issues. The establish- 

 ment of a special congressional committee or subcommittee to deal 

 with East-West trade, roughly paralleling the Jackson Subcommit- 

 tee on SALT, 121 might be appropriate. The creation of the Jackson 

 Subcommittee gave evidence of congressional interest, involvement, 

 and authority. 



Direct congressional involvement would seem especially desirable 

 in view of the complex, significant, and long-term nature of the U.S.- 

 U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission deliberations. Such involvement 

 on a continuing basis could facilitate effective treatment of issues con- 

 cerning statutory authority, such as Most- Favored -Nation Agree- 



121 Subcommittee to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Senate Committee on Armed 

 Services, Chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson. 



