606 



ments, and in general those in which congressional interest is high, 

 e.g., export-import credits. 



It would also appear desirable that the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com- 

 mercial Commission include a blend o.f political leaders (from both 

 executive and legislative branches), technical trade specialists, and 

 Soviet area specialists. As the effective protection of U.S. interests 

 requires a continued high-level political and lower-level technical in- 

 volvement, institutional means should be sought for keeping attention 

 at all levels high. Moreover, the principle of professional continuity: 

 at the working level should be adhered to in order to meet the level 

 of Soviet competence in negotiations and administration in the 

 Commission. 



THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS 



IS CRUCIAL 



The present period appears to be a critical one in U.S. -Soviet rela- 

 tions. If the two countries move ahead in developing commercial re- 

 lations, progress in political, cultural, and other areas may be facili- 

 tated. The failure to do so may engender disappointments, frustra- 

 tions, and suspicions which could ultimately result in a return to the 

 pre- Summit atmosphere. In short, an opportunity is now available to 

 the United States which might conceivably lead to either substantially 

 expanded relations over a 10- to 20-year period or, if the opportunity 

 is not seized and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade is not now expanded, to con- 

 tinued diversion of the Soviet market to Western European and Jap- 

 anese suppliers and to a sharp deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations. 



RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP CAN BE REDUCED 



BUT NOT ELIMINATED 



Because political benefits are the main measure of net gain to the 

 United States from any pattern of increased U.S.-Soviet trade, care- 

 ful calibration of the risks and uncertainties is in order. 



If the Soviet Union is indeed in the process of reordering priorities 

 and accepting greater involvement in the international political and 

 economic system — i.e., accepting the rules of behavior of that system — 

 a significant reduction of impediments to trade may result ; this would 

 be much more beneficial to the United States than would the modest 

 economic gains to be derived from expanding markets. 



If, however, Soviet trade overtures do not extend further than a 

 willingness to settle old accounts, such as Lend Lease, and purchase of 

 more grain and technologically advanced equipment, in exchange for 

 relaxation of trade and credit restrictions, U.S. policymakers may be 

 well advised to limit concessions and engage in hard bargaining, with 

 expectation of only modest political and economic benefits. 



The policies followed by the United States and the Soviet Union will 

 greatly influence the probabilities of alternative outcomes. As the 

 policy objectives of the Soviet leaders are especially crucial to such a 

 projection, it cannot be known for some time with any certainty which 

 different alternative courses, or what compromise between them, is 

 being followed. 



Thus, as knowledge of which of the alternatives will prevail may not 

 be evident for several years, very careful official and public scrutiny of 

 each step in the progress of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Com- 

 mission discussions would appear to be in order for both the executive 

 and legislative branches. 



