82 



Board, was the national rivalries which would result as countries en- 

 gaged in atomic energy development : 



National rivalries in the development of atomic energy 

 readily convertible to destructive purposes are the heart of 

 the difficulty. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may 

 be carried on by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are 

 engendered that place so great a pressure upon a system of 

 international enforcement by police methods that no degree 

 of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly hope to 

 cope with them. 55 



International oionership and operation of dangerous activities: 

 Awareness of the political problems caused by inescapable national 

 rivalries provided the main basis for the Consultants' proposals. The 

 Consultants sought to eliminate these rivalries by internationalizing 

 certain activities which might become a source of competition among 

 nations. As was the case with the Consultants' views of inspection, they 

 looked to both technological and political considerations to support 

 their ideas for assigning certain activities to an international 

 Authority. 



The practicability of such an international Authority, in their view, 

 would be derived from certain technological characteristics of atomic 

 energy development. An inherent technological difficulty of an inspec- 

 tion system was how to determine the intent behind an activity in 

 atomic energy development, that is. whether it was designed for peace- 

 ful or military purposes. 



The Consultants asserted that specific categories of activity could be 

 identified which, if undertaken by an individual nation, clearly would 

 constitute a violation of the control system: such activities should be 

 assigned to an international Authority. This arrangment would elim- 

 inate the need to determine intent behind a national activity in the 

 atomic energy field. This concept was developed to the extent that the 

 Board named in broad terms certain '"safe" and "dangerous" activi- 

 ties. They warned, however, that these categories would have to be 

 subject to constant reevaluation and revision in light of potential ad- 

 vances in atomic energy. 



One example of how internationalization would function concerned 

 the raw materials needed for atomic weapons; namely, ores of uranium 

 and possibly thorium. 5 " The existing technical knowledge at that time 

 supported the conclusion that these materials were the only source of 

 nuclear fuel materials 57 which could energize nuclear reactors for use 

 either to produce fissionable materials for nuclear explosives, or to 

 generate electricity. The practical problems posed by attempting to 



monitor the use of these raw materials were considered "most difficult." 

 Hut management of actual mining operations by an international 

 Authority would provide assurance that it could account for all sources 



ra Ihid ]> 5 



w The role of thorium in atomic energy illustrates the difficulty Imposed by secrecy. The 

 fact was still "classified" In 1946. that the addition of slow neutrons to thorium converted 

 it Into U 238 , which was fissionable. Nevertheless the Acheson-Lillenthal report proposed 

 thai its presence In a nuclear reactor Bhould be prohibited withoul Baying why. 



Uranium ores could provide the raw material for production of the fissionable isotope 

 uranium-235, and also for the manufacture of plutonlum by the exposure of uranium-238 

 to neutrons within a nuclear reactor. Uranium 235 and plutonlum could be used for nuclear 

 weapons. 



