83 



of raw materials. Moreover, if possession of raw materials should be- 

 come the exclusive prerogative of the international Authority, any at- 

 tempt on the part of an individual nation to exercise control over raw 

 materials would represent a clear violation. Mere possession, irrespec- 

 tive of use or intent, would be illegal. An added advantage owing to 

 technological factors was that this particular violation would occur 

 early enough in the development process to allow other nations to take 

 appropriate action to prevent national production of atomic weapons. 

 Another advantage created by technological circumstances was that 

 uranium and thorium occurred under special geological conditions 

 which reduced the task of controlling the raw materials to "manage- 

 able proportions," a characteristic of a control system which the Con- 

 sultants considered essential to effective safeguards. Moreover, the 

 Consultants concluded that enough knowledge had been acquired to 

 indicate that this principle regarding raw materials (as well as others) 

 was not likely to be altered significantly by further scientific 

 discoveries. 58 



A similar case could be made for the plutonium-producing atomic 

 reactor, a design which produces material usable for either atomic 

 weapons or power. By granting responsibility for building and operat- 

 ing such reactors solely to an international Authority, an attempt by a 

 country to usurp this activity would represent an unambiguous viola- 

 tion. Determination of intent for the use of the product of the re- 

 actors would not be necessary. 



Aside from the technological concepts which were considered to 

 justify international operation of a number of specified activities, the 

 report commented on another quality of such an approach which would 

 make it advantageous to a secure system of safeguards. The activities 

 which the Consultants contemplated turning over to an international 

 Authority were also considered those most likely to foster rivalry 

 among nations. Removing these from national hands would greatly 

 reduce, if not eliminate competition among nations in atomic energy 

 development, thereby enhancing the security of nations under the con- 

 trol system. 



Another advantage of internationalization was illustrated by the 

 proposal to give the Authority the function of development and re- 

 search in the field of atomic energy. This function would be aided by 

 the fact that the Authority would conduct the principal processes of 

 atomic energy development. Both practical and political concepts 

 played a role in establishing the report's position on this point. In the 

 opinion of the Board, the control organization would have to stay in 

 the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy to maintain 

 awareness of discoveries which could have a potential for violation of 

 a control agreement. Thus a research and development function for 

 the international agency would enhance the efficiency of the control or- 

 ganization in detecting violations. An additional reason for assigning 

 this function to the international Authority was based partly on the 

 technological prospect that in the foreseeable future, atomic energy 

 could be used substantially in a beneficial way. This function, it was 

 suggested, would attract and hold the skilled, imaginative staff so 

 vital to the successful operation of a control authority. But the prin- 



58 Indeed, one section of the report, "The Adequacy of Present Scientific Knowledge." is 

 devoted to explaining that there were basic scientific principles which could be expected 

 to remain unchanged, and would therefore provide a reasonably sound basis for devising 

 a control system. 



