88 



diction of the international Authority, in one way or another. One 

 point on which the United States yielded to private and national in- 

 terests concerned raw materials, which were proposed to be placed 

 under the international Authority's "dominion" 1 ; specific forms of 

 control over the natural deposits would depend on the geological, min- 

 ing, refining, and economic circumstances of the various locations 

 where they were found. While the second U.S. memorandum stated 

 that the Authority should have such control as would insure "its com- 

 plete and absolute ownership of all uranium and thorium produced,'' 

 the proposal involved a control system imposed upon national mining 

 and concentrating operations, rather than simply transferring these 

 activities to the international Authority, as the Acheson-Lihenthal 

 report had proposed. 



It will be recalled that the Acheson-Lilienthal report displayed some 

 enthusiasm for allowing national and private participation in certain 

 areas of atomic energy development. But when Baruch presented the 

 U.S. proposals to the UNAEC, the main concern over national ac- 

 tivities was that they Avould be subject to licensing and inspection by 

 the Authority. As noted above, he questioned the effectiveness of de- 

 naturing to prevent illegal diversion of activities in national hands. 

 Moreover, Baruch stated that national activities should be subordinate 

 to the international Authority and added that this represented "neither 

 an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national author- 

 ities." 



In the brief discussion of inspection in Baruch's speech, he men- 

 tioned the advantages of the overall plan, which stressed international 

 ownership, thus providing unambiguous evidence of violations and 

 limiting inspection requirements. He also noted that those activities 

 licensed by the Authority would be subject to inspection. II is third 

 point, however, which was to become a focus for Soviet opposition 

 dining the negotiations, was an insistence on freedom of access. He 

 said : Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of 

 the Authority must be assured." 7 " Less attention was given to the idea 

 of linking the developmental function with inspection, as the Acheson- 

 Lilienthal report had done. 77 



U.N. STALEMATE OVER CONTROL AND INSPECTION 



Soviet reaction to jrroposed interTiationalizaiion: Typical of the 

 Soviet I'nion's reaction to the notion of international ownership was 

 Gromyko's comment on the IXAEC's first report; he labelled the 

 whole concept "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable," and added that 

 international ownership and managerial control "would lend to inter- 

 ference by the control organ in the internal affairs and internal life 

 of States and eventually would lead to arbitrary action by the control 

 organ in the solution of such problems as fall completely within the 

 domestic jurisdiction of a State." 78 



Soviet reaction to the requirements for inspection set forth by 

 Baruch was unequivocal, as indicated by a press release which dis- 



•" Ibid., i>. 1001. 



"The first U.S. memorandum touched on the issue of inspection In a manner similar to 

 that of Baruch's speech. The second memorandum expanded on the Idea by elaborating the 

 d( tail- of Inspection, I.e.. adequate provision would have to be made for inspectors in terms 



Of communication and transportation, as well as unhindered access to the facilities In 



question. 



7 "Stat>- Department, Polioi/ at the Crossroads, p. 80. 



