99 



to be a favorable one during the stages of transition. As far as facil- 

 ities were concerned during the transition, all operating facilities 

 would be located in the United States; and if a breakdown in the con- 

 trol system occurred, this country would have the advantage. Sim- 

 ilar assurances were given with regard to the release of information. 

 As noted above, information necessary for release during the nego- 

 tiations met- the security requirements set down in the earlier study by 

 the Manhattan District Group. Moreover, the report explained, the 

 items of information it advocated were "of a theoretical and descrip- 

 tive nature and have in large part to do with the constructive applica- 

 tions of atomic energy [and] involve almost nothing of know-how." 110 

 The report contended that a major source of U.S. superiority in atomic 

 energy rested in the actual experience of working with the facilities. 

 Thus, the Acheson-Lilienthal report relied in part on certain tech- 

 nological considerations to meet some of the political demands associ- 

 ated with the transfer of U.S. information or facilities. (One example 

 is the assertion that selective release of technical information would 

 not jeopardize U.S. security.) At the same time, however, the Consult- 

 ants pointed out that many political decisions would have to be made 

 in order to determine U.S. policy on the arrangements for the transi- 

 tion to international control. These decisions would be governed partly 

 by the general trend of the negotiations, but would have to define the 

 circumstances under which the United States was willing to relin- 

 quish those atomic energy facilities associated with its destructive ap- 

 plications and which were then viewed as temporarily the exclusive 

 property of the United States. It is interesting to note that on this 

 latter point, the letter of transmittal of the report to Secretary Byrnes, 

 written by Acheson, discusses the stages at length, and calls for fur- 

 ther study and decisions to support U.S. policy on transitional stages. 

 Indeed, the letter even comments on the question of U.S. production of 

 bombs, but does not take a position : 



The development of detailed proposals for such scheduling 

 will require further study and much technical competence and 

 staff. It will be guided, of course, by basic decisions of high 

 policy. One of these decisions will be for w T hat period of time 

 the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs. 

 The plan does not require that the United States shall dis- 

 continue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the 

 plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. 

 At some stage in the development of the plan this is required. 

 But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be con- 

 strued as meaning that this should or should not be done at 

 the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever 

 made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affect- 

 ing our security, and must be made by our Government under 

 its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of 

 the world situation. 111 



INCONCLUSIVE TREATMENT OF THE TRANSITION ISSUE BY UNAEC 



The U.S. policy on stages, as enunciated in Baruch's speech and in 

 the memoranda which elaborated the U.S. position, did not develop 



u °Ibid., p. 52. 

 v* Ibid., p. vi. 



