105 



terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The 

 terror created by weapons has never stopped men from em- 

 ploying them. For each new weapon a defense has been pro- 

 duced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate 

 defense does not exist. * * * The search of science for the 

 absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. 127 



In light of the fact that the atomic bomb inspired such awe, it is 

 not difficult to understand how an important U.S. political stance could 

 experience such a drastic modification in the form of the proposal 

 that the veto power should not be exercised over sanctions for viola- 

 tions of atomic energy control. 128 



Another technological consideration which may have had a bearing 

 on U.S. policy toward the veto question concerned the "warning de- 

 vice" aspect of the plan in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Policy dis- 

 cussions revealed that the Board had not envisioned any international 

 stockpile of bombs. Thus, if a nation decided to embark on an atomic 

 weapons development program by seizing production facilities of the 

 international Authority, the sequence of technological processes of 

 producing atomic weapons would take considerable time. The Board 

 estimated that it would be approximately 1 year before enough atomic 

 weapons could be produced to constitute a significant threat. During 

 the drafting of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, one member of the 

 group envisioned the following situation in the event of a violation of 

 the international control system : 



Supposing denatured material had been allocated to a plant 

 which is located in Ruritania, and the Ruritanian Pooh-Bah 

 decides to w T elsK on the Atomic Development Authority by 

 removing the denaturants. The •Authority's representatives, 

 made up of people of many nationalities, try to check on the 

 plant, on the watch for just such a move. So the Pooh-Bah 

 sends soldiers to get the ADA people out of the way and seize 

 the factory. Assuming that the Pooh-Bah has the scientists 

 working for him, it will still take him in the neighborhood of 

 a year to turn out a bomb. While he's at it, the member coun- 

 tries of the Authority, having received no satisfactory answer 

 to what's become of their inspectors, go to war with Ruritania 

 * * * the war would have to be along conventional lines. 

 Naturally, the atomic plant would be the first target for the 

 attacking planes. 129 

 Presumably, the Board considered that the warning device aspect 

 of the plan satisfied the technological requirements of security. How- 

 ever, this conception was not shared by all of those involved in U.S. 

 policy deliberations. One source states that Baruch's position on this 

 question was that the Board's plan provided "no more of a warning 

 than S3 months to a year,' " although the origin of his estimate is not 

 clear. Moreover, Baruch added that technological developments could 

 shorten even that amount of time. 130 These estimates may account for 



127 State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 138-139. 



12R Nonetheless, it should be recalled that this was not the first occasion when this line 

 of thinking on the destructive potential of atomic energy affected policy, for it had played 

 an important role in inflnpncinc nations, including the United States, to take the initial 

 steps ; for example, the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, et cetera, toward seeking agree- 

 ment on international control of atomic energy. 



1=0 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 247. n~ m ~.i<,oi n *, 



130 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 

 p. 573. 



