115 



stantially to development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy could 

 not be released in the absence of international controls, as such peace- 

 ful development was so closely connected with the information neces- 

 sary for development of an atomic weapon. Thus, the hope of sharing; 

 the knowledge for beneficial uses of atomic energy became an incentive 

 for the Lilienthal Board to devise an effective control system. Such 

 hopes apparently influenced both U.S. policymakers and the other 

 negotiators in the UNAEC to believe that the control plan offered 

 something more than a rein on the destructive forces of atomic energy. 

 Although present-day development of atomic energy for peaceful 

 uses — a quarter-century later — is advancing at a substantial pace, the 

 predictions of 1945 regarding the imminent development of peaceful 

 uses seem overly optimistic. Notwithstanding the optimism, however, 

 security factors so overshadowed all other issues in the negotiations 

 that the drive by individual countries for active international coopera- 

 tion in peaceful development failed to develop real momentum at that 

 time. 



These technological factors tended to limit the ontions of the non- 

 nuclear countries participating in the negotiations. Essentially, for 

 any such country there were only two options : development of its own 

 atomic bomb, at considerable industrial effort and economic cost, or 

 controlled access to the technology through acceptance of a plan for in- 

 ternational control, defined by the only country which possessed the 

 ultimate weapon. To supporters of the U.S. proposals, perhaps suffici- 

 ent confidence existed between them and the United States that its 

 pledges and its control plan seemed reasonable. Moreover, many coun- 

 tries, recovering from their massive war efforts, lacked the reserves of 

 resources to develop their own atomic weapons. The promise of the 

 potential benefits of atomic energy for national purposes, however 

 limited, which the control plan offered may have provided additional 

 incentive for approval of the U.S. proposals. 



It is doubtful that the Soviets experienced a similar reaction. In 

 commenting on the plan proposed by the Board of Consultants, one 

 source speculates on the Soviet reaction as follows : 



* * * The members of the Lilienthal Board were con- 

 vinced that adoption of their plan by the Soviet Union would 

 cause no less than another revolution in Russian society — a 

 revolution which was to be accomplished apparently in re- 

 turn for Russian involvement in atomic development. This 

 could not have seemed a very desirable quid pro quo to the 

 Russians, who knew that they were capable of building 

 atomic weapons themselves in three or four years. 152 



A political miscalculation by the United States affecting the negotia- 

 tions can be identified in light of U.S. experience in its relations with 

 the Soviet Union. One source has expressed the possible Soviet percep- 

 tion of the Baruch plan as follows: "The clear advantage offered the 

 U.S.S.R. was relief from an 'out of the blue' American atomic air 

 attack, but at a price of forgoing any early moves toward nuclear 

 equality." 153 An almost axiomatic reflex of the Soviet approach to 

 arms control negotiation has been the notion that the Soviet Union 

 will not negotiate from an inferior military position. One explanation 



152 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 409. 



163 George H. Quester. Nuclear Diplomacy: the First 25 Tears (New York : Dunellen Co., 

 1970), p. 20. 



