143 



luting the breeder concept into practice appeared to be extremely 

 difficult and in 1947 the chances for successful breeding were said to 

 be marginal at best. 10 



The General Advisory Committee 17 shared Zinn's pessimism. On 

 November 23, 11)47, the committee expressed doubt that it would be 

 possible under the most favorable circumstances for any considerable 

 portion of the power supply of the world to be replaced by nuclear 

 fuel within 20 years. 18 



Subsequent history confirmed their observation. Even by the early 

 1970s, nuclear power accounts for only a small percentage of electrical 

 power generation in the United States and of the world. However, by 

 the 1990s it is expected to supply half of the electricity needs of the 

 United States and a quarter of U.S. total energy needs. 



Changing Technology mid Diplomacy 



During the late 1940's and early 1950's diplomats struggled toward 

 international control of atomic energy. Efforts of the United Nations 

 Atomic Energy Commission resulted in diplomatic frustration. Mean- 

 while, scientists and engineers were progressing toward commercial 

 nuclear power, and the initial pessimism about commercial nuclear 

 power shifted to optimism, an optimism that was soon to affect Amer- 

 ican diplomacy. For example, in June 1952 a Canadian leader in 

 nuclear energy, J. Lome Gray of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., 

 said : 19 



We are convinced, even with our present incomplete knowledge of this tech- 

 nology, that fission of natural uranium will produce energy that can and will 

 compete economically with coal or oil. We are thinking at this stage of quite large 

 control power stations. 



A few months later, AEC Commissioner Eugene M. Zuckert 

 wrote : 20 



Study of the development of atomic energy from 1942 leads me to feel that the 

 strides the engineers and scientists are making are so great that "power only" 

 reactors may be nearer than we dare hope for, even though we are still in the 

 early phases of research and development. 



By December 1952, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had 

 concluded that atomic power for industrial purposes was technically 

 feasible, and that the only problem was its cost. 21 



Interest in International Collaboration 



If this optimism was to be justified, prototype nuclear power plants 

 had to be designed, built, and put into operation to provide engineering 

 and operating experience for the nuclear industries and the electric 

 utilities. The AEC wished to get on with this demonstration, but 

 its nuclear power program became caught up in the controversy of 

 public versus private generation of electricity. One pragmatic solution 

 was to build demonstration plants overseas. Arranging such demon- 



16 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan. Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (University Park, 

 Pa. : The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1969). p. 29. 



17 The General Advisory Committee to the USAEC was created by the Atomic Energy 

 Act of 1946 and for almost a decade had a powerful influence within the Commission. 



18 Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit.. p. 116. 



19 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on .Atomic Energy. Atomic Poirer anil Private Enter- 

 prise, 82nd Cong.. 2d Hess.. December 1952 (Joint Committee print), p. 3. 



20 Loc. cit. Reference to "power only'' reactors is important, for previously many 

 observers hwl argued that at best nuclear power could be economically competitive only as a 

 byproduct from manufacture of plutonium for bombs. 



= l Loc. cit. 



96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 11 



