162 



... In the uncommitted areas of the world, American leadership in making 

 atomic power available could be a strong influence in guiding these areas toward 

 a course of freedom. In this sense, atomic power acquires great importance in 

 international relations. This consideration should strongly influence our national 

 policy as to the rate at which the development of atomic power suitable for such 

 purposes is pressed. There is urgency for the development in the United States 

 of atomic powerplants suited to the needs of the other nations of the free- 

 world. . . 



This urgency which exists for foreign atomic power has domestic benefits 

 as well. The growth of an atomic power program will probably not become signifi- 

 cant before 1965. A gap may occur for the power equipment manufacturing 

 industry between present domestic interest in atomic power reactors and actual 

 sales in substantial volume. If the equipment manufacturers . . . are to be 

 expected to carry forward research and development directed toward making 

 atomic power competitive in the United States, the foreign market for power 

 reactors with its high near term growth potential may offer a solution to bridg- 

 ing this gap. The potential demand may represent a $30 billion market. 



But this sense of urgency was not strong enough to warrant U.S. 

 incentives to the European electricity industry that went beyond those 

 offered by the AEC to the domestic nuclear power industry. The 

 McKinney Panel avoided proposals to supply nuclear fuel without 

 charge, or to pay repurchase prices for byproduct plutonium from 

 European power plants higher than those paid to domestic nuclear 

 power producers. Also, no special financial arrangements were pro- 

 posed. Instead, the panel preferred the normal channels of U.S. foreign 

 financial assistance. "Any other course will complicate to the point 

 of un workability what should be a straightforward comprehensive 

 policy covering international activities of the United States." r,r 



In reference to the domestic concerns that byproduct plutonium 

 from nuclear power might lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

 the McKinney Panel opted for a two-pronged approach to safeguards. 

 It called for inspection rights under the bilateral agreements plus 

 reprocessing of the used European fuel in the United States. 88 



By April 1, 1958, the AEC had in effect 30 agreements for coopera- 

 tion in nuclear research and 11 for nuclear power with 39 countries. 

 Four more research agreements and three power agreements with an 

 additional four countries were signed and being ratified. 09 Table I lists 

 these agreements. 



•"Ibid., p. 06. 



«T1ic panel said: "We believe the United States should pet on with making atomic 

 power available now to these nations. We believe that this can and should be done on 

 an Interim basis with bilateral agreements permitting appropriate Inspection, providing 

 for earmarking Of plutonium and uranium 233 thus recovered exclusively for further 

 peaceful uses. Other control mechanisms for a broader nature can be devised and agreed 

 upon later." Ibid., p. 96. 



"•U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Development, Grotrth 

 and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong.. '2d Sees., 1958, p. 79. 



