192 



special terms which would enable it to be a competitive supplier in the 

 world market. As he analyzed the situation, unless other governments 

 volunteered to become suppliers, countries wishing to obtain uranium- 

 235 had two options. They could deal directly with the United States, 

 or go to the International Agency. He anticipated they would prefer 

 the former, which he too preferred as in the best interests of the United 

 States. He said : 137 



... if they deal with us under an individual bilateral agreement, we have 

 some control over where this material goes and for what purpose it is used, and 

 we do not have that if it is channeled through the International Agency. There- 

 fore. I think the present arrangement is a good one from our standpoint. 



He opposed Director General Cole's proposition that the United 

 States supply nuclear materials to it at a discount of 3 to 5 percent : 13S 



... I believe that this possible function of the International Agency which 

 Mr. Cole laid great stress on in his speech in March has been greatly overem- 

 phasized in his mind and in the minds of a lot of other people. I do not believe that 

 it is one of the principal functions of the International Agency to act as a broker 

 between the countries who make U-235 or enriched uranium and the countries 

 who require it. 



That same year AEC Commissioner John Floberg told the third ses- 

 sion of the IAEA General Conference that the United States saw for 

 the Agency a continuing and important role as a supplier of source and 

 special nuclear materials. 139 Asked why, in view of the AEC's attitude, 

 a bilateral agreement with the International Agency was necessary at 

 all, Commissioner Vance said it would provide the machinery for sup- 

 plying nuclear fuel, even though the amount to be delivered might be 

 nominal. "We have gone this far, we should go on to the point where 

 nobody can accuse us of pulling back the offer that was made."' 140 



So although Atoms for Peace proposed a strong supply function for 

 the International Atomic Energy Agency, within a few years this 

 function had atrophied. U.S. policy prevented the Agency from 

 obtaining nuclear materials from the United States at a wholesale or 

 discount price for resale to other members. Whether the Agency 

 would in fact have been strengthened by a more favorable policy is 

 now academic, for other supply channels are now well established and 

 it is unlikely that they would be abandoned now in favor of the 

 International Agency. 



International Standards for Nuclear Safety 



One little-developed function of IAEA which could have affected 

 commercial nuclear power in Europe was the setting of international 

 safety standards for nuclear power. Commissioner Vance and others 

 had called attention to this function and the Department of Stale 

 and AEC had both emphasized the importance they assigned to it. 

 During hearings on the International Statute, Secretary Dulles justi- 



137 V K. Concress, Joint Committee on Atomic Enortr.v. Hearings, Agreement for Co- 

 operatinn Between the United States and the International Atornie Energy Agency, op. 

 clt., p -•• 



" R IMd., p. 21. 



"" r s Atomic Knprpy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, 

 January— December jf>5.9,op. clt., p. 104. 



'"t'S. Congress, Join! Committee on Atomic Kncrpy, Hearings, Agreement for Co- 

 operation Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. clt., 

 p. 25. 



