200 



supported the revision before the Joint Committee, describing it as 

 intelligible, comprehensive, and likely to provide a mechanism for 

 effective safeguards on peaceful nuclear programs around the world. 162 

 Also in 1965 the United States expanded its original four reactors 

 offer by voluntarily putting under IAEA safeguards the 175 megawatt 

 Yankee nuclear power plant at Rowe, Massachusetts. This action 

 provided IAEA inspectors with practical experience with a larger, 

 regularly operating, nuclear power plant and was expected to confirm 

 the U.S. position that safeguards would not interfere with efficient 

 operations of nuclear facilities. During 1965 IAEA inspectors made 

 10 inspections of the reactors under voluntary safeguards. 163 



By the end of 1965 two other supplying countries also were using 

 trilateral agreements that involved the IAEA. One was among the 

 IAEA, Canada, and Japan; and others were among the IAEA, 

 the United Kingdom and Japan, and Denmark, respectively. 



In 1966 President Johnson pledged full U.S. support for the 

 Agency's safeguards system, which he characterized as one of the 

 principal instruments for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 

 In a message to the 10th General Conference, he said : 164 



. . . the Agency has a crucial responsibility to see that the vast beneficial 

 uses of nuclear energy are not diverted for military purposes. I cannot say 

 often enough that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the 

 most important tasks of our times. We look on the Agency's safeguards system 

 as one of the principal instruments for accomplishing this task. The U.S. Govern- 

 ment fully supports the Agency system and we will do all in our power to support 

 the continued growth and technical effectiveness of the system. 



To show its support, the United States voluntarily permitted appli- 

 cation of safeguards to a commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facil- 

 ity. That April, at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, 

 the United States offered, in cooperation with the company con- 

 cerned, 165 to make the fuel reprocessing plant available to the IAEA 

 to develop and test safeguards techniques and to gain experience and 

 training for its inspectors. During 1966, IAEA inspectors made 10 

 inspections of the Yankee plant, including 4 unannounced visits to test 

 provisions of IAEA inspection procedures for access at all times to 

 power reactors. 



In 1967 the United States suggested at the 11th General Conference 

 of the IAEA that the Agency's systems extend to fuel fabrication 

 plants. 166 Far more important, on December 2, 1967, President John- 

 son announced that when safeguards were applied under a nonpro- 

 liferation treaty for nuclear weapons, the United States would volun- 

 tarily permit the International Agency to apply its safeguards to all 

 nuclear activities in this country, excluding only those with direct 

 national security significance. 167 



In 1968 IAEA safeguards were extended to cover facilities for cer- 

 tain chemical processing of nuclear fuel materials and for fabrication 



103 Statement of Charles W. Thomas. Office of International Scientific Affairs, Donart- 

 iii.nt df State. In D.S. Congress, lolnt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International 

 Agreements for Cooperation, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 14. 



>*'< U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 

 Commission for 1965, op. clt., p. 2. r >7. 



184 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, 

 .latuinry-December 1966 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 

 p. 201. 



ln "' Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., of West Valley, New York. 



1M U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to the Congress on the Atomic Energy 

 Commission for 1967 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 210. 



ia,7 Ibld., p. 216. 



