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the member nations has nearly drowned Euratom, leaving it since 1968 

 without a 5-year program, with sharply reduced funding and, 

 perhaps worst of all, without an involvement in application of nuclear 

 power technology in Europe. Political difficulties have blocked cooper- 

 ation with Euratom's supply function for nuclear materials and with 

 plans to develop a European enrichment capability. 



Euratom's successes have come in activities which were distantly 

 linked to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of 

 France, Italy, and West Germany. These included model legislation 

 to encourage uniformity in national regulation of radiological effects 

 of nuclear power, research into subjects without immediate com- 

 mercial application, and safeguarding nuclear materials. But Eura- 

 tom has not been able to weld together the separate national nuclear 

 industries of its members. Euratom research and development which 

 approached commercial application has been opposed and was ulti- 

 mately terminated. The differing ideas of France, Italy, and West 

 Germany as to which kind of nuclear power technology to exploit 

 created tensions that on several occasions all but paralyzed Euratom's 

 research and development programs and led to the charge that some 

 member nations were benefiting disproportionately at the expense of 

 others. The inability to form a common European approach to nu- 

 clear technology has proved advantageous to the U.S. nuclear industry 

 and in the 1970's the use of U.S. nuclear power technologv is well estab- 

 lished in Europe, having overmatched the alternative favored by the 

 French. Among the Euratom members there is increasing use of joint 

 venturas between companies in the several national European nuclear 

 industries as an alternative to working through Euratom. There are 

 signs also that Euratom's laboratories may have outlived their useful- 

 ness and now face the problem of what to do with their human and 

 physical resources. Steps to open Euratom's facilities to non-nuclear 

 research and development are one indication of the situation. What can 

 be learned from this trend to convert Euratom's research installations 

 into general research facilities for the European Economic Com- 

 munity can be of interest to the United States for two reasons. First, 

 a successful transition of a substantial part of Euratom's research 

 capabilities to non-nuclear research could strengthen the competitive- 

 ness of European high-technology goods and services in the world 

 markets vis-a-vis those of the United States. Second, a successful 

 transition might well provide useful insights into the problems of 

 conversion of existing scientific and technical institutions into new 

 fields as their original field becomes worked out, or as changes in 

 national priorities and programs make them redundant. This transi- 

 tion, of course, is the problem of the U.S. defense and aerospace in- 

 dustries with the continuing unemployment of highly skilled scientists, 

 engineers, and technicians. 



Several issues for United States foreign policy and Euratom that 

 may need future attention include : 



(1) To what extent should the United States encourage Eur- 

 atom to build and operate a uranium enrichment plant in Europe? 



(2) In supplying XLS. enrichment technology, if this is done, to 

 what extent should the United States attempt to recoup the do- 

 mestic investment in developing that technology through licensing 

 fees or royalties ? 



