VIII. Joint United States-Euratom Research and Development 



U.S. diplomatic efforts and interest which helped bring about the 

 creation of Euratom led naturally to the proposition that the United 

 States should work closely with this new multinational body. As 

 analyzed in retrospect by Jules Gueron, 219 the following was the ra- 

 tionale for a 10-year period of direct technical cooperation between 

 Euratom and the United States. Europe had to import an ever- 

 increasing proportion of its conventional fuel ; therefore, atomic power 

 could become competitive in Europe earlier than in the United States, 

 and Europe could benefit economically and technically from being a 

 testing ground for United States atomic technology. At the same time 

 the United States would aid European unification. 220 This theme is 

 examined and confirmed in the following discussion. 



The United States-Euratom program was launched in 1958 and had 

 as its target the construction by 1965 of 5,000 megawatts of electrical 

 generating capacity in nuclear power plants based on U.S. technology. 

 It offered low interest loans from the Export-Import Bank, lease of 

 fuel by the AEC, and guarantees on supply of fissile material and per- 

 formance of nuclear fuel supply bv the U.S. nuclear industry. In addi- 

 tion, the United States agreed to Euratom control of nuclear fuel ma- 

 terials instead of direct U.S. control, and to a joint program of research 

 and development in support of the joint reactor program. Neverthe- 

 less, it proved impossible to reach the 5,000 megawatt target, and only 

 with difficulty were three nuclear power plants initiated that had a 

 combined output of 750 megawatts. 



In Europe, these U.S. incentives were supplemented by advantages 

 provided bv the Euratom Treaty to "common enterprises,'' and bv the 

 "participation" assistance especially devised by the Euratom Com- 

 mission. Parenthetically, France opposed the whole scheme as a sell- 

 out to the United States, while influential voices in the United States 

 branded the joint programs as a giveaway. 221 



The joint United States-Euratom programs were a disappoint- 

 ment. Their shortfall from original goals was the result in part of an 

 unanticipated easing of the energy supply crisis in Europe, of unex- 

 pectedly slow progress in nuclear technology, and probably an over- 

 estimation of the willingness of European private utilities to risk sub- 

 stantial capital investments in demonstration nuclear powerplants. On 

 the other hand, the two joint programs did culminate in several work- 

 ing demonstrations of nuclear power; moreover, they provided 10 

 years of practical working experience of collaboration with a multi- 

 national organization to develop and demonstrate a new technology. 



From 1959 to 1909, the United States provided technical and other 

 forms of assistance and incentives through Euratom for construction 

 of three demonstration nuclear power plants in Europe; it spent some 



sl * FormpT rpnprnl rltrpptor of rpsparph for Euratom. 

 120 Gupron, op. pit., p. 149. 

 421 Loc. cit. 



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