261 



a comparative -study of the merits of otheV processes $ or manuf aefcu*^ 



ingen^iched uranium. 318 ■ rYniavi 



r.«T! . • •> ' . ■-■ ■ • . ' ?y • .• ■ ; • ..' mmu 



! ■ • 



SOME VIEWS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE 



The 'Joint ■•Committee on Atomic Energy has closely followed pro-: 

 posals to'sell U.S. diffusion technology. Considering the close relation 

 between the Joint Committee and the AEC, and its insistence upon 

 being Currently informed of the Commission's activities, the Commit- 

 tee's views must be taken into account by U.S. diplomats seeking to 

 arrange ior export of this technology. 



• In 1969 the Joint Committee was not convinced that the United 

 State*' should encourage the building of a European enrichment 

 capacity. One member of the Conimittee bluntly warned other conn-' 

 tries that onee they established their own enrichment capacity, there 

 was not a single, solitary reason for the United States to retain the 

 "incredibly generous" terms of its toll-enriehment contracts. Should 

 the Europeans persist with their plans to build their own facilities, 

 he said, then the United StatesI should consider alternatives. For in- 

 stance, the United States might sell enriched uranium at competitive 

 prices in the world market .rather than at production costs. Were this 

 to be done, the capacity of the U.S. production plants and their operat- 

 ing efficiencies would permit sale of enriched uranium at prices well 

 below those feasible for a European plant. While such a policy might 

 increase AEC's domestic operating expenses, it could substantially 

 help alleviate the U.S. balance-of -payments deficit in word trade. 319 

 The Joint Committee kept pressing the administration for details 

 about the export or sharing of U.S. diffusion technology. For example, 

 on September 16, 1970, it met in executive session with the Atomic 

 Energy Commission to express its concern that the executive branch 

 did not have specific and detailed plans to propose. The Committee 

 clearly regarded possible export of enrichment technology as a signif- 

 icant and fundamental change in U.S. policy for international atomic 

 energy. At the close of the 91st Congress, in December 1970, it an- 

 nounced its intention to take a hard look at any proposal that this 

 technological asset be provided to foreign entities; The Committee 

 said it would examine the question not only from the "giveaway" 

 aspects, friit also from the point of view of its possible effects on na- 

 tional security and obligations of the United States Under the Non- 

 Prolrferation Treaty. 380 



The Gas Centrifuge: A Technical Perturbation for U.S. Policy? 



3y early 1972, three European nations were working together to 

 perfect and demonstrate the gas centrifuge m process for enriching 

 uranium. They saw this as an alternative to depending upon the 

 United States for enrichment service, or for gaseous diffusion tech- 

 nology. If the gas centrifuge development is proven to be technologi- 

 cally and economically successful, the subsequent deployment of this 

 process could raise problems for U.S. diplomacy. Even now, there is 



«* Loc. cit . . 



*»Xu(teo*lC9 Week, vol. 10 (April 17, 19«0), p. 5. 



8ao U.S. .Cj>ngress k Joint Committee 011 Atomic Energy, "Activtty and Accomplishments of 

 the Joint Gomnrtttee on Atomic Energy during the Second Session of the Olst Congress," 

 Congressional Record, vol. 116, p. 44324. 



881 Cf. Section II for a description of the «as centrifuge process. 



