264 



By 19V0 the French Government was planning for an enrichment 

 facility with a capacity about three times the estimated need for 

 1980. The substantial excess capacity would be available to sell on the 

 world enrichment market. As for competition with the United States, 

 the planned sales price would be less than that currently charged by 

 the AEC. The proposed facility would be financed two-thirds by loans, 

 leaving $200 million to be raised through direct capital investment of 

 $40 million a year, a sum which would be well within French means. 

 French technology would be used, which the French consider equal 

 to that of the United States and superior to Britain's. However, they 

 would like access to U.S. technology, if this access is not top expensive. 



An interesting aspect about the French plan was its circumvention 

 of normal diplomatic channels and government-to-government negoti- 

 ations. Instead, the French invitation was informally addressed to 

 European industry with the thought of securing participation by 

 corporations rather than governments. While the latter may have been 

 preferred, the French reportedly had grown tired of diplomatic de- 

 lays. Also, an appeal directly to industrial firms could permit in- 

 direct support from governments publicly committed to the gas 

 centrifuge project. France apparently hoped that Britain, the Nether- 

 lands, and West Germany can be attracted to join in a diffusion plant 

 venture and to abandon their centrifuge project. From the standpoint 

 of the U.S. interest, the French proposal of a single, multinational 

 enrichment plant would be preferable to a possible proliferation of 

 nationally-owned, gas centrifuge plants. Time for a final decision is 

 beginning to run out. One must be made by 1973 if Western Europe is 

 not to risk a shortage of nuclear fuel. 325 



Conclusions and Current Issues 



During 1970-71. diplomacy and diplomats were involved with, or 

 affected by, a number of initiatives taken by European governments 

 to secure for themselves a role in uranium enrichment. Taken as a 

 whole, these initiatives suggest that the forces of fragmentation 

 within the European nuclear community remained strong. They re- 

 flected also U.S. desires to encourage multilateral construction and 

 operation of a large enrichment plant in Europe as an alternative to 

 a proliferation of smaller separate facilities. The initiatives included : 



(1) A declaration by the EEC of the need to construct a Eu- 

 ropean enrichment facility ; 



(2) A tripartite agreement among Britain, West Germany, 

 and Holland to develop the gas centrifuge for enrichment of 

 uranium; 



( 3 ) A decision by the French Government to plan construction 

 of an enrichment plant in Europe ; 



(4) A French decision to study construction of an enrichment 

 facility by means of collaboration of technical companies; 



(5) The announced AEC intention to permit a limited number 

 of American companies to have access to secret enrichment tech- 

 nology ; and 



(6) An AEC offer to help foreign countries, particularly Eu- 

 ropean, to build an enrichment plant. 



»*Nucleonic8 Week, vol. 12 (March 18, i:iTn, pp. 1-2; Nuclear Industry (April 1971), 

 p. 40 ; Wall St net Journal (March 12, 1971), p. 5. 



