273 



One of the most important actions of the Safeguards Committee 

 was to specify the use of national systems of accounting and control 

 for nuclear materials. The United States consistently supported this 

 idea to avoid duplication of systems. For the United States the princi- 

 ple of independent verification is the cornerstone of any meaningful 

 system of safeguards. Deciding whether there has been a diversion 

 must rest on objective evidence examined by international inspectors 

 and not on information made available by the inspected party itself. 



As analyzed by the United States, it was impractical for the Agency 

 to operate a materials accountability system with its own accountants 

 and auditors in each nuclear facility. This approach would have de- 

 manded far more resources than would be available to the Agency, as 

 well as far more intrusion into national nuclear operations than would 

 be tolerable. Independent verification to authenticate findings and 

 data in, national systems was seen as the solution. 



The .Federal Republic of Germany, likely to be a principal Euro- 

 pean user of nuclear power, wanted a national accounting and control 

 system, to serve as a fink between the IAEA and operators of nuclear 

 power plants. According to one analysis: "This arrangement reduces 

 the Agency's safeguards costs and. at the same time avoids the arising 

 of substantial differences in the .application of safeguards between 

 countries forming part of a regional safeguards systems," 340 



,A satisfactory national svstem would include a measurement system 

 for the determination of the quantities of nuclear fuel material im- 

 ported, produced, shipped, lost, or otherwise removed from inventory. 

 It would #lso ; need procedures for evaluating accumulations of un- 

 measured inventory and losses, the precision and accuracy of measure- 

 ments, differences in shipper/receiver measurements, and so on. A 

 state having a national svstem with these characteristics would pre- 

 sumably Tbe subject to a minimum of Agency verification. 



PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 



Another important result of the Safeguards Committee's work was 

 to provide a state being inspected with assurances that its legitimate 

 commercial interests would be protected. The guidelines enjoin the 

 Agency to exercise extreme care in the protection of commercial se- 

 crets, to avoid undue interference with the nation's peaceful nuclear 

 activities, and to conduct safeguards in a manner consistent with 

 the economy and safety of the activities concerned. 



The Safeguards Committee's report incorporates the principle that 

 information about design of nuclear facilities supplied by member 

 states should be limited to that necessary for safeguards. It also con- 

 tains an important new feature that if a state so requests, the review 

 of information of particular commercial sensitivity can take place in 

 the country concerned so that reports and drawings do not have to 

 leave the country or remain on file in the IAEA. 



INSPECTIONS AND THEIR SCHEDULING 



The draft agreement lays down formulas for determining the 

 "intensity" of inspection for several categories of nuclear facilities. 



mo Werner Ungerer, "Safeguards : Five View?," International Atomic Energy Agency 

 Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), p. 4. 



