279 



budget. Those IAEA members who had not signed the Treaty, pri- 

 marily France and India, expressed concern lest money be diverted 

 from other Agency activities to pay for safeguards in which they had 

 no interest. 362 



The Safeguards Committee recommended one of two approaches to 

 financing safeguards. 353 



(a) An agreement with a member of the Agency should provide 

 that each party thereto shall bear the expenses it incurs in imple- 

 menting its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the state or 

 persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a 

 result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall re- 

 imburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to 

 do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional 

 measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or 



(b) An agreement with a party not a member of the Agency 

 should . . . provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the 

 Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs. However, if 

 the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary ex- 

 penses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency 

 shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in 

 advance to do so. 



A JOINT COMMITTEE RESERVATION 



Some members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have ques- 

 tioned costs of IAEA safeguards. Representative Craig Hosmer esti- 

 mated that if the Agency had undertaken inspection of peaceful 

 nuclear activities in 1968 it would have needed a total of 245 inspec- 

 tors at a cost of $17 million. Based on five full-time inspectors for each 

 1,000 megawatts of installed nuclear capacity, plus one and one-half 

 full time mspectors for every two power plants, and estimating a world 

 total of 4,000 power reactors by the year 1990, he forecast that some 

 16,725 IAEA mspectors would be needed for safeguards at an annual 

 cost of $1.1 billion. 354 He asked whether such an international burden 

 would be tolerable. 



More recently, in its annual report for 1970, the Joint Committee said 

 it was mindful of the importance of safeguards, but was looking very 

 cautiously at the growing IAEA safeguards program and what could 

 develop into a need for increased funding to support the numbers of 

 personnel which may be necessary. 855 



Physical Security of Nuclear Materials 



IAEA safeguards under the Treaty have only one purpose : to detect 

 the diversion of nuclear fuel materials from authorized purposes. 

 Physical security measures to prevent thefts have no place in the 

 Treaty. It is assumed that governments will maintain appropriate 

 physical security and will deal with theft. But is this a tenable assump- 



•"Thls point was made by Frank Barnaby, Director of the Stockholm International 

 Peace Research Institute, in "Safeguards — With or Without Strings?", New Scientist and 

 Science Journal, vol. 49 (February 25. 1971), p. 432. 



868 INFCIRC/153, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 



tu U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agree- 

 ments for Cooperation — 1967-68, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1968, p. 74. 



858 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Activity and Accomplishments 

 of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy During the Second Session of the 91st Congress, 

 op. cit., p. 44324. 



