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assistance and related functions have been stunted by asymmetrical 

 preoccupation with safeguards? "" 



U.S. diplomacy inevitably will have a major responsibility for work- 

 ing out answers to these issues. 



(3) Voluntary safeguards in the United States: Two Presidents 

 have committed the United States voluntarily to place its nuclear in- 

 dustries under IAEA safeguards as an inducement to persuade non- 

 weapons nations to sign and ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty. At 

 the moment, the ratification process is incomplete and the United 

 States has not been called upon to honor this offer. However, it may 

 be timely to consider foreign and domestic policy implications of the 

 offer, such as : 



The acceptable scale of IAEA inspections ; 



The degree of reliability desired ; 



Whether the function of IAEA safeguards will be independ- 

 ently to detect unauthorized diversions, or to assure that national 

 safeguards systems are adequate to do so and to test them occa- 

 sionally ; 



Necessary limitations upon IAEA use of inspectors who are 

 nationals of nations whose foreign and domestic policies are in 

 conflict with those of the country to be inspected; and 



Available measures to protect trade secrets of the host coun- 

 try's nuclear industry while at the same time providing adequate 

 access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear materials in process and 

 in inventory. 



(4) The -physical security issues: The IAEA safeguards system is 

 limited in purpose to detecting diversion of nuclear materials. It does 

 not extend to security and other measures to protect the materials 

 against attempted diversions. To what extent, if any, should U.S. 

 foreign policy attempt to extend the IAEA safeguards function into 

 physical protection and security of nuclear materials and to apprehen- 

 sion of would-be diverters? 



(5) Increased U.S. assistance in nuclear energy: A premise of the 

 Nonprol iteration Treaty is that the nuclear weapons states will share 

 with the non- weapons states the benefits of nuclear energy to induce 

 them to agree to international safeguards. This commitment has im- 

 plications for foreign and domestic U.S. policy for nuclear energy. 

 To what extent is the United States prepared to shape its develop- 

 ment of nuclear power technology to meet the needs of the non- weapons 

 states? Are present forms and channels of U.S. nuclear technological 

 assistance sufficient for purposes of the Treaty, or need they be broad- 

 ened and expanded? Should the U.S. develop those nuclear power 

 technologies which can use natural uranium or thorium as fuel and 

 thus avoid the requirements for enrichment and safeguards? These are 

 some of the questions that combine elements of nuclear technology, 

 domestic energy policy, and diplomacy which will have to be answered 

 during the 1970's. 



