333 



In retrospect, the way in which the Soviet and American responses 

 to the CSAGI proposal developed can be held responsible to a large 

 degree for the subsequent American, and world, reaction to Sputnik 

 I. On April 16, 1955, only 6 months after passage of the CSAGI 

 proposal, the Soviets announced creation of a Commission on Inter- 

 planetary Communication which, as one of its functions, was to 

 organize work on the construction of artificial earth satellites. 111 



No mention was made of the IGY, however, and the report went 

 largely ignored by the rest of the world. 112 Three months later, on 

 July 29, 1955, President Eisenhower announced that artificial satel- 

 lites would be launched as an integral part of the U.S. IGY program. 113 

 Unlike the earlier Soviet announcement, the Eisenhower announce- 

 ment received widespread attention. Of particular interest was the 

 U.S. plan to develop a nonmilitary rocket, the Vanguard, specifically 

 for IGY purposes, rather than make use of existing military rockets. 

 This decision was made by American scientists who hoped to develop 

 not only their own launching rockets, but also the necessary tracking 

 facilities, computers, and related support systems in order to ". . . 

 remain independent of military security and military requirements 

 and to develop a satellite designed solely for the gathering of scientific 

 information." 1H Only a few days after the Eisenhower announcement 

 of American plans, the Soviets announced that they, too, would 

 launch IGY satellites, but no specifics were given at that time. 

 Thus, the stage was set for the beginning of the "space race" be- 

 tween the two powers. 



Following these initial announcements of IGY satellite activity, 

 a number of further clarifying announcements were made from time 

 to time by both participants. The gist of these remarks was that the 

 American satellites would be relatively small, light spheres, about 20 

 inches in diameter, weighing about 20 pounds. 115 The original plan 

 called for 12 rocket propulsion vehicles, thus theoretically making 

 possible the launching of 12 instrumented research satellites. 118 Sub- 

 sequently, the size of the satellites was revised somewhat higher, from 

 20 to 30 inches, inclusive, but the satellites continued to be popularly 

 referred to as basketballs. 117 The U.S. effort was described by Dr. 

 Homer E. Newell, Jr., who substituted for Berkner as CSAGI reporter 

 for rockets and satellites, as being 



. . . simply an extension of the conventional rocket program, which in turn 

 has been thought of as an integral pari and natural extension of the overall IGY 



effort. 118 



Comment concerning the Soviet effort, on the other hand, indicated 

 that Soviet satellites might be considerably heavier than the American 



111 Krieger, Behind the Sputniks, p. 330. The formation of the Commission, headed by L. I. Sedov, was 

 announced in the newspaper Vechernyaya Moskva. 



112 Sullivan, "The IGY," p. 301. 



1,3 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space Programs, 1966- 

 70, 92d Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 9, 1971, p. 160. 



114 Wilson, Neiv Moons, p. 66. 



'i° House, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, pp. 451, 461. 



i" House, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, p. 452. 



117 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 

 1956, Hearings on H.R. 10004, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 20, 1956, p. 222. As the U.S. plan actually developed, 

 !he first Vanguard satellite was a 6-inch test sphere weighing 3.5 pounds, containing only a radio transmit- 

 ter. Vanguard II weighed 20.7 pounds, and Vanguard III 100 pounds. These were the only Vanguard sat- 

 llite~ launched: eight other attempts to orbit Vanguard satellites failed. 



1,8 Speech of Sept. 9, 1955, reproduced in the CSAGI Bulletin a" Information. 



