354 



out that "The IGY had helped significantly to contribute to the 

 atmosphere of international scientific cooperation in which the 

 Geneva talks were held," 229 and U.N. Secretary General Dag 

 Hammarskjold, in his Annual Report to the United Nations General 

 Assembly, had noted that "the Geneva agreement suggested a way 

 by which further progress might be made in separating the political 

 from the nonpolitical." Hammarskjold went on to point out that 

 discussion by scientists 



. . . would not in itself bring about disarmament, but it might help to im- 

 prove the atmosphere and clarify many of the problems involved, thus preparing 

 the ground for a time more politically propitious than the present seems to be 

 for a general disarmament agreement. 230 



Although it is too soon to judge its significance, the Test Ban 

 Treaty appears to have been a critical forward step toward the 

 responsible international control of arms in the interest of world 

 peace and security. President Kennedy is said to have attached 

 great importance to the treaty as a symbol winch 



. . . would provide a turning point, a way to break out of the circle of fear» 

 distrust, conflict, insistence on strength, demands for guarantees, insistence on 

 the unchanging and implacable hostility and activist role of the Soviet Union, 

 and the futile search by the United States to bring back the total security of the 

 preatomic period. 231 



To a considerable extent, the President's attitude thus was in close 

 agreement with the political expectations raised by scientists during 

 the IGY. It seems a fair assumption that at least some aspects of 

 the IGY experience were translated into political attitudes and 

 behavior which ultimately led to the Test Ban Treaty. 



The treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, received 

 Senate approval on September 24, was signed by President Kennedy 

 on October 7, and entered into force for the United States on October 

 10. In article I of the treaty, each signatory agreed to prohibit all 

 nuclear explosions on territory within its jurisdiction and control, 

 including tests of nuclear weapons, in the atmosphere or under water. 

 This prohibition also encompassed outer space and the high seas. 

 Nuclear explosions were prohibited in any environment whatsoever if 

 they might result in the presence of radioactive debris outside the 

 territorial limits of the nation conducting the explosion. Furthermore, 

 signatories agreed to refrain from offering help or encouragement for 

 any nuclear weapons tests whatsoever within the prohibited 

 environments. 232 



These provisions bear a resemblance to article I of the Antarctic 

 Treaty banning "the testing of any type of weapons." It is clear from 

 congressional hearings and debates on the Test Ban Treaty that the 

 IGY experience and the Antarctic Treaty were prominent in the 

 thoughts of many participants. Reference was made to the fact that 

 the Antarctic Treaty had been in force for almost 5 years without 

 incident, and the debate prompted the first formal inspections to be 

 carried out under article VII or the treaty. 



»• Sullivan. "The TOY," p. 334. 



J " United Nations General Assembly, Official Record*, 13th sess., 1058, snpp. No. !A, p. 1. 

 "' U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, 

 and Development, Technical Information for Congress, 92d Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 16, 1971 (revised edition), 



a* Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. M33 (Washington: U.S. Govern- 

 ment Printing Office, 1963), 76 pp. 



