398 



hoped would bring economic and political stability to the countries of 

 the region, satisfy the diplomatic objectives of the United States, and 

 prove acceptable to the other great powers of the world ("Including 

 the Soviet Union"), as well as undercutting immediate motivation of 

 the Vietnamese communists, and responding to the expressed anxieties 

 of the nonaligned powers. It is possible, in short, that it looked toward 

 a balanced world system of developing regions, benefiting themselves 

 from orderly advance ; ' such a system might perhaps have eased 

 world tension generally. 



The relation of the speech to U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia is il- 

 luminated by remarks by Leonard Unger, an official of the Department 

 of State, shortly after the Johnson speech. There were four of these 

 objectives : 



First, that the nations of Southeast Asia, as with other Asian states, should 

 develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and to- 

 ward increasingly democratic structures. 



Second, that the nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside 

 nations. 



Third, that no single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise 

 domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it. 



And fourth, that the nations of the Far East should maintain and increase 

 their ties with the West in trade and culture, as a major means of knitting to- 

 gether a peaceful and stable world. 40 



Relationship of U .S .-Vietnamese War Goals to Regionalism 



In an earlier study in this series, the consensus on American foreign 

 policy goals was discussed in the following words : 



"These might be summarized as a world of peace and freedom, or a 

 peaceful world order in which justice and freedom prevail, or a world 

 in which the United States may exist in peace and security. 



"Within these broad goals there are more specific objectives. The pro- 

 motion of mutual understanding and friendly relations, further prog- 

 ress toward a sound and expanding world economy, the wider appli- 

 cation of international law, the reduction and control of armaments, 

 or the building of collective security systems, for example, are objec- 

 tives through which the United States is seeking to attain a world of 

 peace and freedom. These objectives in turn may be broken down into 

 still more specific components such as, in the case of the reduction and 

 control of armaments, regulation of the military use of the ocean bed 

 or outer space." 41 



In an age in which powerful nations possess nuclear weapons and 

 means for their delivery to a target thousands of miles away, a cate- 

 gorical imperative in support of the objective of security is that un- 

 limited or total war between nuclear-armed powers be avoided. A cor- 

 ollary of this proposition is that no overt conflict can be permitted to 

 occur between such powers, lest it escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 

 This set of conditions is superimposed on more traditional objectives or 

 guidelines of U.S. foreign policy, such as self-determination by peoples 

 of their own forms of government ; peaceful resolution of international 

 disputes; free and unrestricted international commerce; unobstructed 

 transit of persons ; freedom of the seas ; and economic and technological 



40 "Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia," Department of State 

 Bulletin (May 10, 1965), p. 712. The statement was In an address before the Detroit Eco- 

 nomic Club, Detroit, Michigan April 19, 19<;:>. 



"U.S. Congress, House, Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age (Washington, D.C. : 

 U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1970. See vol. I, p. 22. 



