429 



It also is able to draw on many sources of capital and skill, and pro- 

 motes international cooperation. 100 



The virtually limitless opportunities for capital investment in civil 

 works projects in developing countries are reduced when pre-in vest- 

 ment studies are undertaken of the economic and social consequences 

 of such investments. Further limitations derive from the generally 

 accepted necessity — of which Black spoke — that decisionmaking should 

 come from the region itself. Former colonies engaged in nation-build- 

 ing are likely to be wary of external interference, even with the best 

 of motives. And there are always differences among factions within 

 regions and countries. All these are limiting factors to rate of capital 

 transfer from outside. As one study observes : 



. . . Diversities, antagonisms, and strong nationalism within the region and 

 the uncertainty of benefits from existing proposals for formal integration all 

 suggest that outside encouragement should be in the main through informal, 

 partial, politically-neutral measures of obvious joint benefit. Outside encourage- 

 ment of major integration projects should be limited ; more emphasis needs to 

 be placed on research and mutual education through discussion of problems and 

 possibilities. Until potential participants in Southeast Asian regionalism see 

 clearly that there is a problem, that the problem can best be met through regional 

 efforts, and that the net benefits to each participant will be significant with in- 

 cursions on national sovereignty minimal, pressures from outside the region are 

 unlikely to achieve a continuing effect. 101 



As a general principle, therefore, the cited study calls for avoidance 

 of political suspicions and antagonism in the face of political and 

 economic differences and sensitivities. "Regional cooperation measures 

 have the best chance of success when they achieve a net maximum of 

 two goals: the maximum of intraregional political neutrality and 

 colorlessness." 102 



A plausible case can be made that precisely the virtues of regional 

 development as an efficient means of accelerating the economic progress 

 of blocs of poor countries (thereby reducing the "frustrated expecta- 

 tions" that encourage insurgency) would lead to automatic rejection of 

 such an approach by the large communist nations. In fact, the Soviet 

 Union has tended to be cool toward developmental regionalism, and 

 has tended to favor direct bilateral aid arrangements on a country-to- 

 country basis. However, the Soviet attitude toward developmental 

 regionalism has not been as strongly negative as that toward regional 

 security arrangements. It is at least conceivable that some forms of 

 regional development arrangement might be eligible for Soviet ac- 

 ceptance. While the Soviet Union has not yet actually contributed 

 as a donor country to the Mekong Project, at the Fifteenth Session of 

 ECAFE, meeting at Broadbeach, Queensland, Australia, in March 

 1959, the Soviet representative, Mr. Chernyshev, was reported as say- 

 ing "that the Soviet Union was prepared to provide technical assist- 

 ance in the planning and construction of hydrotechnical projects on 

 the Mekong. The terms and details of such assistance could be agreed 

 upon with the countries concerned either directly or through the 

 ECAFE secretariat." 103 



100 Ibid., pp. 166-168. 



101 Theodore Morgan and Myle Spoelstra, Eds., Economic Interdependence in Southeast 

 Asia (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 416. 



102 Ibid., p. 11. 



103 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Summary Records, (May 11, 1959), 

 p. 195. 



