538 



is business, and, if it is going to go on in any event, we might as well have a piece 

 of the action. 12 



The new attitudes expressed by Mr. Misnik and Mr. Peterson pro- 

 vided the impetus .for conclusion of a series of agreem™ r ^ regulating 

 and promoting U.S.-Soviet trade. On July 8, 1972, an agreement was 

 reached providing credit through the U.S. Commodity Credit Cor- 

 poration for Soviet purchases of American grain. A maritime agree- 

 ment was concluded on October 14, 1972, which removed several bar- 

 riers to commercial shipping between the two countries. On October 18, 

 1972, a commercial agreement and a settlement of the Soviet Lend- 

 Lease debt were signed. The commercial agreement projected a trip- 

 ling of U.S.-Soviet trade within a three-year period and provided a 

 number of regulatory measures. The Lend-Lease settlement arranged 

 a repayment schedule for the Soviet World War II debt to the United 

 States. 



The Disengagement of Congress From U.S.-Soviet Trade Negotiations 

 Dealing with the broad question of American international eco- 

 nomic policy, the Williams Commission Report in July 1971 made 

 clear that a major and direct role of Congress in trade negotiations was 

 necessary and desirable : 



. . . The U.S. Congress has the constitutional responsibility for regulating 

 trade. It delegates the administration of this responsibility to the Executive, 

 which has the constitutional responsibility for negotiations with foreign govern- 

 ments. This makes it all the more important that we do our utmost to provide for 

 continuous, close communications between the Executive and the Congress, so as 

 to ensure the effective pursuit of our national objectives. 



We recommend that the negotiations be buttressed in advance by appropriate 

 congressional action. In some areas, such as tariffs, a specific delegation of 

 authority to negotiate and proclaim changes in U.S. restrictions will be needed. 

 In other areas, the Administration should negotiate on the basis of a congres- 

 sional declaration of intent; the results of the negotiations would be submitted to 

 Congress, either for affirmative action, or preferably subject to an understanding 

 that they could be implemented by the Executive unless rejected by Congress 

 within, say, 60 days. Furthermore, some Congressmen should be included in the 

 United States delegations to the negotiations. 1 * 



The Peterson Report in December 1971 also referred to a special 

 congressional role in fashioning a new international economic order: 



Of critical importance in our efforts will be the new legislation needed to 

 equip American negotiators with the tools for constructing a new, open and fair 

 world trading system. Defining the negotiating authority we need will require 

 close collaboration with the Congress. In the international negotiations under- 

 taken with this authority, our intention will be to construct a new trading sys- 

 tem to take the place of the old." 



However, no effort was made to involve Congress in U.S.-Soviet 

 trade negotiations. Congress did not pass enabling legislation to facili- 

 tate a trade agreement between the two countries. Only after the trade 

 agreement had been concluded did the Nixon Administration turn to 



"Peter G. Peterson, U.S.Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era (Washington, 

 D.C. : Department of Commerce, August 1972), p. 13. [Hereafter cited as Peterson Report 

 (1972). 1 



13 Williams Report, op. clt., pp. lfr-17. 



u Peterson (1971) op. clt., p. v. 



