541 



of the United States with respect to such advances in weaponry as the 

 Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). 



(b) On internal moderation or reform. — Some observers point to 

 a continuing need for moderation to encourage professionalism and 

 accommodate modernization. Others, however, point to the restrictions 

 on civil liberties, religious freedom, the right to emigrate, and access 

 to foreign media as evidence of a retrogression or toughening of the 

 Stalinist elements in the system. 



(c) On the control of the bloc. — Some observers maintain that the 

 relaxation of Soviet-U.S. tensions, the potential reordering of Soviet 

 priorities, and a moderating of domestic controls may permit more 

 foreign policy independence and internal reform in Eastern Europe. 

 On the other hand, the Soviet Union, given some relaxation of ten- 

 sions vis-a-vis the West, may decide it can get away with perpetuating 

 the post-Czech invasion "Brezhnev Doctrine," which severely limits 

 Eastern European independence from Moscow. 



Recent expressions by Dr. Henry Kissinger appear to incline toward 

 the more hopeful, less threatening interpretation of the progress to- 

 ward detente to date, while accepting the view that opposing trends 

 and pressures exist. The Soviet leadership, Dr. Kissinger pointed out 

 in a congressional briefing in June 1972, is responding to the pressures 

 which make for detente as well as to the older, conservative pressures : 



. . . Some factors — such as the fear of nuclear war, the emerging consumer 

 economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society — 

 have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the 

 United States. Other factors — such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the 

 catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas — have prompted pressures for 

 tactical gains." 



Earlier in the same briefing, Dr. Kissinger noted : 



But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment 

 of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political 

 strength. 18 



Dr. Kissinger also saw enhanced security in the collective benefits or 

 linkage among various agreements such as those on arms limitations, 

 trade, and the environment : 



We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of 

 negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best 

 served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested 

 interest in mutual restraint. 19 



. . . The SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in 

 the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some 

 sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically to a chain of agreements and 

 to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers 

 of the nuclear age. 20 



The process of creating a "vested interest in mutual restraint" is 

 likely to be a very gradual and protracted one. Moreover, future 

 changes in Soviet foreign policy and the motivations of Soviet leaders 

 in their conduct of diplomacy will not be easily discerned. The political 



17 Kissinger briefing to Congressional leaders, Congressional Record, June 19, 1972, 

 p. SOfiOO. 



18 Ibid. 



19 Ibid., p. S9600. 



20 Ibid., pp. S9599-9600. 



