282 



Treaty expected that the Commission of the European Communities 

 would enter into negotiations with the IAEA. To emphasize their 

 desire to preserve Euratom safeguards, they expressed their intention 

 not to ratify the Treaty before such negotiations has produced an 

 agreement. 362 



A RECENT DEVELOPMENT 



The most recent development affecting Euratom safeguards under 

 the Treaty is the reported agreement in principle between Euratom 

 and the International Agency for IAEA inspection of nuclear activities 

 in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany, 

 but not in France. European Economic Community sources say the 

 five will drop their insistence that tighter Euratom inspections be 

 allowed in France as a prerequisite to their approval of IAEA inspec- 

 tion of their facilities. Thus by giving in to the French, who had agreed 

 only to Euratom inspection of French facilities for nuclear materials 

 from non-French sources, the way could be cleared for ratification of 

 the Treaty by Euratom members. 363 



Conclusions and Current Issues 



The development of international safeguards is an evolving inter- 

 action between nuclear technology and American diplomacy. The 

 United States has consistently supported international safeguards 

 administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. U.S. sup- 

 port of the Nonproliferation Treaty has reaffirmed the importance 

 that this Nation attaches to effective performance of safeguards — a 

 technological activity growing out of the discovery of nuclear fission. 

 As a gesture to persuade other nations that the inspection provisions 

 of the Treaty do not impose an unacceptable interference with na- 

 tional sovereignty, the United States has volunteered to place its civil 

 nuclear industry under IAEA safeguards, and the United States has 

 already voluntarily placed several nuclear facilities under these safe- 

 guards. 



Another task for U.S. diplomacy will be to assure a satisfactory 

 outcome of the agreement reached between the IAEA and Euratom 

 for continuation of the Euratom safeguards system in cooperation 

 with IAEA safeguards. These safeguards arrangements between two 

 international agencies will be important for the future of Euratom. 

 A success would add reason for future support to this declining orga- 

 nization. Also, success could present an interesting issue for U.S. diplo- 

 macy should the Soviet Union propose a similar arrangement for na- 

 tions within its bloc. 



So far the IAEA safeguards system has proven tolerable to na- 

 tions exposed to it under the "trilateral" nuclear assistance agree- 

 ments between the United States, individual other nations, and the 

 Agency. Can IAEA experience, derived from safeguarding compara- 

 livelv small amounts of nuclear materials in special curcumstances, 

 provide an adequate base for the routine safeguarding of large quan- 

 tities? The amounts of nuclear fuel materials now used for civil nu- 

 clear power are modest, as is the amount of plutonium being produced 



382 Memorandum relating to minority and individual views on the Nonproliferation 

 Treat v. In U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonprolijera- 

 tin» Treaty, op. dt., pp. 310-311. 



*» Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 30, 1971), p. 8. 



