V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations 



It appears as though the negotiations came to nothing because the 

 control plans advanced by the Soviet Union and the United States 

 were each based upon their perceptions of a desirable world order 

 and the defense of their respective national interests. In the cir- 

 cumstances of that period, these views and the plans based on them 

 were not reconcilable. The reasoning and perceptions underlying Soviet 

 policy decisions at that juncture are not known with certainty 25 years 

 later, and clearly were less well perceived at that time. The fact that 

 many of the following observations relate mainly to U.S. policy is not 

 intended to be solely a comment on this country's approach to atomic 

 energy control. That such observations are useful arises from the fact 

 that basically it was the U.S. plan which was accepted by the majority 

 in the international negotiations. Therefore, an important part of an 

 inquiry into the outcome of the negotiations lies in the origins of U.S. 

 policy and inputs of U.S. scientists and diplomats. 144 



Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan 



One characteristic of the efforts to achieve control of atomic energy 

 which may have contributed to their failure was the tendency on the 

 part of U.S. policymakers and of the majority of the negotiators in 

 the UNAEC to accept the constraints developed out of technological 

 considerations as the basis for their proposals for a control arrange- 

 ment. The foundations for the concrete proposals by the United States 

 were the technological studies of the Board of Consultants, and when 

 the first signs of impasse appeared in the UNA EC, in 1946, the negotia- 

 tors chose to await a report from the Scientific and Technical Commit- 

 tee before proceeding with the negotiations. However, each scientific 

 group, Lilienthal's and the UNAEC committee, divorced itself from 

 any responsibility for considering the political factors involved in a 

 control arrangement. And the diplomats and politicians, in addressing 

 themselves to the basic political problems which were preventing agree- 

 ment, chose to seek a firm basis for their proposals in what were con- 

 sidered to be the undeniable technological facts of the situation. 



When it was evident that there was little hope for agreement, the 

 basic assertion from the UNAEC was that a minority had failed to 

 recognize the compelling technical factors needed to shape 1 an ade- 

 quate control system. 145 But there appears to have been a larger failure 



of the i \ can only be .'i matter for speculation 



(110) 



