216 



policies for research and technological progress ; that it did not have 

 them ; and that this lack would condemn Western Europe to a per- 

 manent economic and political inferiority vis-a-vis the rest of the 

 world. In a parallel policy paper, the EEC Commission warned that 

 if member states could not find a way to advance together, they would 

 give up the hope of making a good showing in the race for the nuclear. 

 market. 202 



Through 1970 the future of Euratom's research remained uncertain. 

 A restructuring which could have been affected by a simple majority 

 vote in the EEC Council was nullified when the French objected. 203 

 The situation was no better in 1971 when initially the European Par- 

 liament refused to approve Euratom's draft research and investment 

 budget because it was likely to prolong stagnation and absence of 

 decision. 204 



PLUTONIUM FOR FAST BREEDER RESEARCH 



Another example of Euratom's difficulties in carrying out a multi- 

 national program of nuclear research was triggered by a domestic 

 decision of the United States. Euratom's early research emphasized 

 the breeder reactor, and was concentrated in France and West Ger- 

 many. For the experimental work to go forward, plutonium was 

 needed. Euratom had planned to borrow this material from the United 

 States and so had budgeted only for use-charges. When, in 1967, the 

 United States decided as a matter of policy to sell rather than loan 

 the plutonium to Euratom, the price was set at $8 million. This cost 

 caused a financial crisis in Euratom, which asked France to provide 

 40 percent of the U.S. sales price. France refused, saying that it was 

 up to Euratom to supply the material. Euratom capitulated and ulti- 

 mately took the funds from other parts of its budget. Italy then 

 complained that France was monopolizing the most commercially 

 promising work while the other partners shared only in the costs. 205 



The Supply and Control of Nuclear Materials 



Two institutional prerequisites of nuclear power — supply and con- 

 trol of nuclear fuel materials — were the basis for granting suprana- 

 tional authority to Euratom. The Treaty of Rome specified Euratom's 

 ownership of nuclear fuel materials used for peaceful purposes, and 

 vested in Euratom supranational rights of inspection for safeguards. 



The supply function has not grown as originally expected. The safe- 

 guards function, in contrast, has been performed effectively and has 

 demonstrated the practicability of international inspection. It remains 

 to be seen what will happen to Euratom's safeguards function with the 

 advent of the Nonproliferation Treaty and its emphasis on the safe- 

 guards function of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 



203 "Call to Preserve Euratom," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 14 (January, 



1 y oH ) , p. 8. 



,J^" F '" r;ltom I)lH P" te Drags On," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 15 (December 

 1970) . p. 064. 



sot "Euratom Budget Blow," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 16 (Januarv/ 

 February, 1971), p. 8. 



at For a more detailed discussion of this event, see Daniel Greenberg. "Euratom : Atomic 

 Agency Foundering Amidst Squabbles of Its Partners," Science, vol. 163 (February 7, 1969), 



