XI. The Noxproliferation Treaty and Safeguards 



A recent impact of the scientific discovery of fission upon American 

 diplomacy and foreign policy is to be found in the Treaty on Non- 

 proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Thirty years after scien- 

 tists correctly interpreted the meaning of small light pulses upon a 

 cathode ray screen, the U.S. Senate, on March 13, 1969, gave its advice 

 and consent to ratification of an unprecedented concept in interna- 

 tional relations: a general commitment to international inspection 

 within national borders. The concept is radical in two respects : first, 

 it divides nations into two classes — those which have the atom bomb 

 and those which do not ; second, it commits the non-weapons signatories 

 to the Treaty to yield up some of their sovereignty to international in- 

 spections, in return for which they are assured against the dangers of 

 undetected diversion by their neighbors of nuclear materials to manu- 

 facture nuclear weapons. The Treaty is unusual, too, in its operative 

 provisions which bind the non- weapons countries to negotiate bilateral 

 safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Whether this commitment to 

 agree will prove effective, or whether, as some critics claim, it will 

 prove to be worthless; whether IAEA safeguards can, in fact, provide 

 sufficient assurance to alleviate international fear of clandestine 

 diversion on nuclear materials to weapons — these are presently un- 

 answerable questions. 



The entry into force of the Nonproliferation Treaty on March 5, 

 1970 has put into motion a whole host of new international negotiations 

 between the IAEA and the non-nuclear weapons countries, and also 

 negotiations with those nuclear weapons powers which would volun- 

 tarily place their civil nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. 

 Complicating the diplomatic effort is the refusal of France and the 

 People's Republic of China, which both possess their own nuclear 

 weapons, to sign the Treaty, and its rejection by India which appears 

 technologically capable of making such weapons. 



New Urgency for Safeguards 



Discussion of safeguards is timely now because the amounts of nu- 

 clear materials present in the fuel cycles of commercial nuclear energy 

 remain modest. Before the end of the decade of the 1970's, however, this 

 situation is expected to change. Amounts involved by then will present 

 a tempting target to those who may wish to obtain fissionable material 

 for weapons. By the end of the 1970's many countries are likety to 

 be generating significant amounts of nuclear energy with concurrent 

 production of plutonium, and thus possess a potential for making 

 nuclear weapons in quantity. 



The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 1972 

 yearbook <>n world armaments warns that the proliferation of nuclear 

 weapons would lead to a totally new situation in military and strategic 

 affairs. According to SIPRI, the, main factor behind the anticipated 

 spread of nuclear weapons technology is that for most environments 

 nuclear power reactors provide the cheapest means of producing elec- 

 tricity. While, some energy analysts are not this optimistic, pro- 

 ponents of nuclear power anticipate its widespread use within the 

 next two decades. 



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